assessments of the longterm
possibilities and limits of cooperation and
solidarity.
One sort of compromise is illustrated by
Tocqueville’s (2002, p. 192) observation of
Americans’ doctrine of “self-interest rightly understood,”
in which “an enlightened regard for
themselves constantly prompts them to assist
one another.” In this view, the universality of
interest-oriented action is given, but it can generate
cooperative social processes and institutions.
Compromising from the other direction,
scholars posit that “action is determined by ultimate
ends . . . that laid down norms determining
[social] relations” (Parsons 1935, p. 295),
but they also recognize that there is “no reason
why . . . elements of self-interest should not
be involved also” (Parsons 1940, p. 193). Although
this perspective denies the universality
of interest-oriented action, it still acknowledges
it as one among numerous orientations potentially
generated by institutions.
These contrasting positions and their related
compromises underpin explicit investigation
of interest-oriented action in rational
choice theory and exchange theory, on the one
hand, and implicit assumptions about interestoriented
action in cultural sociology, on the
other.