This study examines the effects of performance measurement system design on employees’willingness to share knowledge and their general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours.Two key design issues are examined, namely, incentive scheme subjectivity and com-municating the value of human-based intangible assets through a strategy map. Using acontrolled experiment we found that employees are more willing to share knowledge witha co-worker (even if it means diverting resources away from incentivised areas) undera subjective weighting scheme than a formula-based scheme. In addition, we found aninteraction effect where the communication of the strategic value of human-based intangi-ble assets increases employees’ general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours under asubjective weighting scheme, but decreases this tendency under a formula-based scheme.Our study contributes to the performance management literature and has implications forpractice by providing empirical evidence demonstrating how the design of performancemeasurement systems can motivate discretionary behaviours in relation to performanceareas that are not recognised by the formal incentive scheme.