On the other hand, a few studies suggest that some of the goals of SOX improved financial
institutions in the crisis. Yeh, Chung, and Liu (2011) find in a cross-country study that banks with
fully independent audit committees prior to the crisis performed better, measured by total return to
shareholders and return on equity during both 2007 and 2008. Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2011)
found that, among small and mid-sized U.S. banks, those with auditors that specialized in banking
in 2006 were less likely to fail in the crisis (i.e., 2007 to 2009). Doogar, Rowe, and Sivadasan
(2013) show that audit firms increased fees charged to their banking clients to reflect the changing
risk profile of their loan portfolios and securitization risk over the time period from 2005 to 2007,
suggesting that audit firms recognized client risk and priced their services accordingly. The authors
attribute the failure by audit firms to provide advance warning of client failure to limitations in the
auditor’s report and the scope of the auditors’ disclosure requirements rather than to a failure to
assess client risk. Together, the evidence suggests that better auditing and more independent
auditors did help alleviate the worst effects of the crisis, even if SOX, PCAOB, and audit firms
performed well below the ideal.