A state investigation has determined that the June 18 explosion at the Plumley Division of Dana Corp.’s extrusion plant in Paris, which seriously injured one of the company’s workers, was the result of a combination of factors.
Improper maintenance, lack of operational procedures regarding the plant’s boilers, removal and replacement of critical controls and safety devices and lack of proper training and qualified personnel were all listed as causes of the accident.
Results of the investigation conducted by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s Division of Boiler and Elevator Inspection were released this week in a report by chief boiler inspector Martin Toth.
The boiler that exploded was last inspected by an external agency Jan. 10, according to the report. The boiler was one of two in the plant’s boiler room. Required inspections were not recorded between Sept. 16, 2003, and that date, but no problems were reported in the most recent inspection. Dana employees were responsible for the boiler’s regular maintenance, which was not recorded.
However, investigators examining the boiler after the explosion, which hurled it 100 feet from its original location, found that its pump controller had a bent and broken spring.
They also determined that employees had been manipulating it by hand, bypassing the pump’s automatic system for moderating its water level. An improper relay for the auxiliary low-water cutoff had been installed by Dana personnel, and the manual reset capability was removed.
Investigators believe the most probable cause of the accident was the sudden introduction of feed water to the boiler that at the time of the explosion was operating in a dry-fired state.
The report indicates Leslie Evans, the maintenance worker who was injured in the explosion, entered the boiler room and found that one of the boilers was in a low water condition while the other was at full fire, but also in a low water condition. Feed water was introduced back to the boilers, and the second boiler exploded.
Investigators have not determined whether Evans started this process himself by putting water into the boiler.
Investigators also deduced that the primary low water fuel cutoff was wedged in the up position, perhaps as a result of a previous problem. This explains why the boiler continued to fire despite the low water condition.
In addition, the light bulb for the visual alarm outside of the boiler room was nonfunctional. Investigators did not determine whether the audible alarm sounded at the time of the accident.
Boiler operators are required by a Tennessee Board of Boiler Rules to visit the boiler room every 20 minutes. Dana reported that its employees visited every hour to hour and a half.
The state Division of Boiler and Elevator Inspection made a number of recommendations for future boiler operation at Dana.
The division advised that the corporation develop procedures for training and certifying boiler operators, invest in a remote monitoring system, leave maintenance and inspection to outside vendors, overhaul the alarm system and develop evacuation and emergency procedures.
Andy Doll, plant manager for the extrusion plant, said Thursday he would have no comment about the findings of the report.
A state investigation has determined that the June 18 explosion at the Plumley Division of Dana Corp.’s extrusion plant in Paris, which seriously injured one of the company’s workers, was the result of a combination of factors.Improper maintenance, lack of operational procedures regarding the plant’s boilers, removal and replacement of critical controls and safety devices and lack of proper training and qualified personnel were all listed as causes of the accident.Results of the investigation conducted by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s Division of Boiler and Elevator Inspection were released this week in a report by chief boiler inspector Martin Toth.The boiler that exploded was last inspected by an external agency Jan. 10, according to the report. The boiler was one of two in the plant’s boiler room. Required inspections were not recorded between Sept. 16, 2003, and that date, but no problems were reported in the most recent inspection. Dana employees were responsible for the boiler’s regular maintenance, which was not recorded.However, investigators examining the boiler after the explosion, which hurled it 100 feet from its original location, found that its pump controller had a bent and broken spring.They also determined that employees had been manipulating it by hand, bypassing the pump’s automatic system for moderating its water level. An improper relay for the auxiliary low-water cutoff had been installed by Dana personnel, and the manual reset capability was removed.Investigators believe the most probable cause of the accident was the sudden introduction of feed water to the boiler that at the time of the explosion was operating in a dry-fired state.The report indicates Leslie Evans, the maintenance worker who was injured in the explosion, entered the boiler room and found that one of the boilers was in a low water condition while the other was at full fire, but also in a low water condition. Feed water was introduced back to the boilers, and the second boiler exploded.Investigators have not determined whether Evans started this process himself by putting water into the boiler.Investigators also deduced that the primary low water fuel cutoff was wedged in the up position, perhaps as a result of a previous problem. This explains why the boiler continued to fire despite the low water condition.In addition, the light bulb for the visual alarm outside of the boiler room was nonfunctional. Investigators did not determine whether the audible alarm sounded at the time of the accident.Boiler operators are required by a Tennessee Board of Boiler Rules to visit the boiler room every 20 minutes. Dana reported that its employees visited every hour to hour and a half.The state Division of Boiler and Elevator Inspection made a number of recommendations for future boiler operation at Dana.The division advised that the corporation develop procedures for training and certifying boiler operators, invest in a remote monitoring system, leave maintenance and inspection to outside vendors, overhaul the alarm system and develop evacuation and emergency procedures.Andy Doll, plant manager for the extrusion plant, said Thursday he would have no comment about the findings of the report.
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