The dissertation studies two aspects of the U.S. registered investment companies. The
first essay analyzes the ownership and organizational structure aspect while the second
essay investigates the restructure events of those investment companies. We find sellers
from mutual fund asset sales are mainly financial conglomerates. Funds under
management of those conglomerates experience poor performance during the period prior
to asset sales. On the other hand, acquirers are generally highly focused mutual fund
companies. Funds acquired by these focused entities experience improvement in both
fund performance and operational efficiency. From the analysis of organizational
structure, funds managed by focused mutual fund companies demonstrate better
performance and operating efficiency than those of diversified ones. Funds managed by
diversified fund companies also experience performance deterioration during years
following their IPOs, while focused counterparts encounter performance enhancement.
From the analysis of ownership structure, funds managed by public mutual fund entities
outperform their private competitors. Our evidence indicates that (1) organizational
structure (level of concentration), (2) economies of scale, (3) strengthened monitoring,
and (4) managerial ownership contribute to the superior performance and greater
operating efficiency that occur subsequent to asset sales in the mutual fund industry. We
propose (1) a public trade, (2) a focused business line, and (3) a large insider ownership
to explain the outperformance and management efficiency. Our results not only
contribute to the dynamic of mutual fund operations but also explain the evolution of
business model for the industry organizations of the past decades.