The third interpretation is based on the idea that the crisis is mainly the result of a selffulfilling
panic of investors. This interpretation is described in detail in Radelet and Sachs (1998a
and 1998b). This story goes as follows. Yes, there are vulnerabilities: falling foreign exchange
reserves, slowing export growth, fragile financial systems, and overvaluation of the real exchange
rate. But these vulnerabilities are not enough to explain the abruptness and depth of the crisis.
As some have put it, Athe punishment is much worse than the crime.@ The solution to this
conundrum is that rational investors may have an incentive to pull money out of an otherwise
healthy country if the other investors are doing the same thing. In more formal terms, the crisis is
a Abad@ equilibrium in a situation of multiple equilibria. The bad equilibrium occurs when each
investor comes to expect that the other investors will suddenly pull out their funds. It then
becomes rational for each investor, in fact, to behave just as expected, that is, to suddenly
withdraw the loans that are outstanding. When this happens, a severe economic crisis unfolds.