Marginalization of Moderates
A major characteristic of the 1950s conflicts, as in the 1990s, was the destruction of the political middle ground. In both crises, there were courageous voices of moderation that called for inclusiveness, the restructuring of power relations, and the necessity to attend to the needs of all Rwandans, regardless of ethnic background. But in both cases, hardliners on both sides who made an ethnic appeal gained the upper hand in the debates, effectively marginalizing the more moderate voices in the 1950s and physically destroying such individuals in the 1990s.
Such polarization was already evident following the elections of 1960 and 1961 in Rwanda. The elections had brought to power a republican government dominated by Hutu, with inclusion of a small number of Tutsi in the parliament and cabinet. But in 1964, Tutsi guerrillas invaded the country, attempting to overthrow the fragile government of Gregoire Kayibanda. The invasion collapsed; in its wake the Tutsi members of the government were executed, and the Hutu authorities allowed (or encouraged) massacres of several thousand rural Tutsi residents. These victims were targeted not because they had done anything wrong; rather, they were punished as scapegoats because their ethnic "brothers" (note again the corporate view of ethnicity) had attacked the country.[23]
A similar dynamic was evident in 1990, in the wake of the RPF attack on Rwanda. Within four days of the October invasion, the Habyarimana government had arrested more than 9,000 people, mostly Tutsi, but also Hutu seen as critics of the government. After several months, most of these people were freed, thanks to the efforts of a nascent human rights movement within Rwanda and the pressures of Western donors. But some died, and many suffered serious aftereffects from the ill treatment and poor conditions of incarceration. This was the beginning of a series of minipogroms against Tutsi in different parts of the country carried out by the Habyarimana government--what later would be seen as rehearsals for the conflagration of 1994. Here one can see a recurrent pattern: the tendency for a regime threatened by external attack to target an internal scapegoat and to rationalize its behavior by propagating a corporate view of ethnicity.
Since July 1994, when the RPF ended the genocide and took control of the country, the new Rwandan government has been led by Tutsi in conjunction with the Rwandan Patriotic Army (the military wing of the RPF). Critics of this government assert that the pattern of scapegoating continues. But now, those threatening the regime are Hutu associated with the former Rwandan army (the FAR) and the Interahamwe militias. This time, the power of the Rwandan military has expanded; the scapegoats are not only those within the country but potentially all those living in areas where the FAR or Interahamwe are known or believed to be operating (including, apparently, refugees in Zaire). The rationale has been well rehearsed in recent Rwandan history: if it is impossible to capture the Interahamwe, it is acceptable to liquidate civilians assumed to be associated with them. While this approach may be effective in terrorizing the citizenry, it does little to enhance the legitimacy of the current regime or give it strong roots in the rural population.
Dynamic of Fear
A second parallel between the 1950s and the early 1990s in Rwanda is the tendency for political struggle to be associated with a pervasive dynamic of fear and rural discontent.[24] In both cases, those in power feared losing their position of privilege, with attendant economic consequences and the political risks of being punished for past misdeeds. And those demanding change feared their dissent might bring personal harm. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens feared the consequences of political struggles they knew could have important implications for their tenuous hold on jobs or land they needed for family survival.
Political Patterns
A third parallel places these struggles in broader historical context. Before the mid-twentieth century, crises of governance in Rwanda often had violent consequences, but the violence was limited to a relatively small group of key participants in the competition, often members of the same ethnic group. The losers--usually highly placed political actors--often faced death or exile.[25] Political violence was more often intraethnic than interethnic.
Although this was not unique to Rwandan succession struggles, key aspects of such earlier crises of governance were a winner-take-all pattern for the victors and death or flight for the losers. But in light of recent tendencies to see all conflict in Rwanda as tribal warfare, it is important to note that these were not ethnic conflicts; rather, they were conflicts among competing Tutsi lineages for control of the state.[26] Patterns found in these earlier goverance crises--nonethnic, but involving winner-take-all outcomes and violent exclusion of the losers--reappeared in political conflicts of the terminal colonial period in Rwanda.
These later conflicts, however, occurred in a different context: colonial state building and policies of ethnic favoritism had broadened the stakes and deepened ethnic polarization. The struggle for power had widened, such that in the 1959 Revolution political contestation was perceived as (at least in part) an ethnic struggle. Changes in the state and the new corporate view of ethnicity contributed to implicating whole "ethnic" groups in political competition, and also making them targets of political violence. Whereas rival politicians at the court had in the past been the main protagonists in crises of governance, now ethnic groups came to be seen as collective actors in the political game.
In the early 1990s, Rwanda faced yet another crisis of governance, a struggle over who would control the state. The political landscape was more complicated, and the results of this struggle were much more destructive than in the past. But earlier patterns were still discernible. Contenders for power tried to mobilize their constituencies using an appeal to solidarity based this time, as in 1959, on ethnic identity. Aware of past patterns, some of the protagonists feared that if they should lose this struggle, they and their families would face liquidation; the outcome left hundreds of thousands dead. And when the RPF-led government assumed power, they inherited a shattered polity and society.
Often in Rwanda's recent history, appeals to ethnicity have served as a pretext for political actors seeking to gain or obtain power. It is this type of power struggle that Rwandans must try to avoid in the future. Such was the conclusion of a group of Rwandan intellectuals who debated these issues recently. In their view, a central challenge in the postgenocide era is how to find ways to avoid the winner-take-all politics, liquidation of opponents, and (more recently) mobilization of ethnic factions that have proved so destructive in the past.[27]
Conclusion
Parallels between the politics of the early 1990s in Rwanda and earlier political processes of the late 1950s are striking. At the same time, dramatic differences between these episodes of conflict are sobering, most notably in the scale of violence and loss of life, and the extent of destruction of the country's social fabric and its material infrastructure. Understanding these complicated dynamics is an important challenge for those attempting to revisit Rwandan history and move beyond the debates noted at the beginning of this article.
In reassessing Rwandan history, a focus on changes made by Europeans is important but should not be allowed to deflect attention from those aspects in which Rwandans themselves were involved. Years ago, in an analysis of colonial state building in Rwanda, I argued that politics and policies of the state need to be seen as critical elements in shaping ethnic relations and ethnic consciousness.[28] From this perspective there is ample evidence that it is in the reach of those in power to manage and dampen ethnic tensions by the types of policies they pursue. Paradoxically, however, "managing" ethnic tensions requires transcending them and addressing other forms of social inequality as well.
A case in point is found in the efforts of the Habyarimana regime to dampen ethnic tensions over the period from 1973 to the mid-1980s. Ultimately, the regime's controversial policy of ethnic quotas for government jobs and educational opportunities undermined the effort. Attempts to reduce ethnic tensions did not relieve class inequalities and other serious problems with the patrimonial state in Rwanda. Thus, when faced with a political crisis, those in power found it too easy to use the "ethnic card" to divert attention from unresolved contradictions in the country's political economy.
One of the problems in focusing obsessively on ethnicity is that this may lead one to overlook questions of power and class. Surely such issues were important in the contestation of the 1950s, as in the 1990s, but how were they important? Perhaps in revisiting this history, Rwandans will wish to explore more fully the issues and inequalities that underlay these political conflicts--conflicts that were only partly "ethnic."
To do so, historians and others will have to engage with the competing visions of the past discussed in this essay. They may have to go beyond them rather than choose between them, but they cannot avoid them. To judge by past experience, the way in which the powerholders address these issues could have an important bearing on the lives of millions of people over the coming generation.