Discussion of the definition of corruption has progressed little since Heidenheimer’s groundbreaking
distinction between definitions centred on public opinion, public office and public interest.
All these definitions have been severely criticised. I suggest that underneath these traditional
concepts of corruption lurks a much older one based on distributive justice – namely the ‘impartiality
principle’, whereby a state ought to treat equally those who deserve equally. This principle
provides a much more plausible reason for why the public condemns corruption than alternative
approaches, and, moreover, it is recognised fairly universally: the implicit distinction between
‘public’ and ‘private’ is certainly neither as ‘modern’ nor as ‘Western’ as many have claimed. The
universality of the principle of impartiality does not imply universality of its content: who deserves
equally, or, alternatively, on which grounds discrimination is ruled out, will be answered differently
at different periods in time and will vary from society to society. The impartiality principle
provides a starting point for the discussion of both corruption in ‘traditional’ societies and contemporary
political corruption – corruption involving violations of specific non-discrimination
norms governing the access to the political process and the allocation of rights and resources. The
impartiality principle calls for rule-bound administration and thus underpins the public office
definition of corruption. A central element of the analysis of corruption is the study of specific
non-discrimination norms and their comparison across time and place. This approach leads to a
significant enrichment of the concept of corruption.