These traditions lend added weight to the ideal of harmony between the political moralities. And the force, I would say the
virtue, of these traditions is best served by striking the balance so as to diminish rather than increase the likelihood that each
of the moralities will invade the other's territory. Accordingly our constitutional arrangements should in my opinion provide
an imperative of restraint on the part of the courts when they venture onto the territory of the morality of government. This
imperative is no less important because the judges enter that territory at the behest of statute - the Human Rights Act. It
is justified against the background of our constitutional traditions because the legitimacy of elected power, the authority of
the ballot-box, are the gatekeepers of the morality of government. But judicial restraint is not just a question of democratic
accountability. You will recall a contrast between the two moralities which I have drawn already: while the morality of law
is given effect through settled principles, the morality of government is not. Therefore, when the judges enter into the latter
territory, the armoury of principles by which they wield the law cannot help them. What works in that territory is a utilitarian
perception of the general interest; and that is not the judges' metier.
These traditions lend added weight to the ideal of harmony between the political moralities. And the force, I would say thevirtue, of these traditions is best served by striking the balance so as to diminish rather than increase the likelihood that eachof the moralities will invade the other's territory. Accordingly our constitutional arrangements should in my opinion providean imperative of restraint on the part of the courts when they venture onto the territory of the morality of government. Thisimperative is no less important because the judges enter that territory at the behest of statute - the Human Rights Act. Itis justified against the background of our constitutional traditions because the legitimacy of elected power, the authority ofthe ballot-box, are the gatekeepers of the morality of government. But judicial restraint is not just a question of democraticaccountability. You will recall a contrast between the two moralities which I have drawn already: while the morality of lawis given effect through settled principles, the morality of government is not. Therefore, when the judges enter into the latterterritory, the armoury of principles by which they wield the law cannot help them. What works in that territory is a utilitarianperception of the general interest; and that is not the judges' metier.
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