First, the financial crisis erupted in the form of rollover problems for short-term assetbacked
commercial paper (ABCP) issued by special purpose vehicles (called “conduits” and
structured investment vehicles or SIVs). Many of these vehicles were sponsored by commercial
banks and effectively guaranteed by them. These guarantees implied that the perceived risk
transfer from special purpose vehicles was in effect non-existent. Adequate treatment for
sponsoring such conduits with guarantees was, however, absent in regulatory capital
requirements.v That this was a regulatory failure can be seen by examining the international data
which show that countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, which
adopted lax capital treatment of ABCP vehicles, had significant presence of their commercial
banking sectors in the ABCP market, whereas counterparts in Spain and Portugal, which adopted
economically prudent capital treatment of ABCP vehicles, had virtually no presence in this
market.vi In effect, while the commercial banking sector looked well-capitalized on regulatory
capital front during 2003-07, it had built up significant short-term debt in shadow banks without an economic transfer of risks; this short-term debt experienced rollover problems starting on 8th
August 2007, precipitating the crisis (see Figure 1).