The failure of Barings’ management to prevent the collapse of Barings also resulted from
Barings' flawed internal controls and channels of accountability. “Leeson was responsible for
both the trading and the settlement sides of the Singapore operations, which made it easier for
him to conceal his contracts from his superiors.”28 Nevertheless, senior management officials at
Barings had been made aware of this situation as early as 1992. At that time the head of
Barings’ Securities operations in Singapore alerted the firm's management in London to the
potential dangers of having Leeson manage both trading and settlement. In March 1992 he wrote
to the head of equities in London, "My concern is that we are in danger of setting up a structure
which will subsequently prove disastrous and with which we will succeed in losing either a lot of
money or client goodwill or probably both."29 According to Nikki Tait, the fact that Leeson had
no gross position limits on proprietary trading operations made the potentially dangerous
management structure even worse.30