1
National Security Strategy 2013
Introduction & Guiding Principle
The United States will lead the international order as a nation first among
equals to encourage stability, foster economic growth, promote democratic
values, and protect global strategic interests.
Our nation is strongest when we adhere to the core values and interests of the
citizenry. The principle above should inform every citizen and government
official to understand our national priorities, policy positions, and decisions to
be made during the next four years. The international order has changed
significantly since the end of the Cold War, and will continue to do so. The
United States must prepare for a multilateral world where, while retaining our
military, economic, and cultural preeminence, we may be challenged by both
allies and adversaries. Therefore, Americans must adopt the view from within
and without that we are a nation “first among equals” to reflect the trends of
demographics, global finance, and military power.
Strategically limiting American hard power to maximize our effectiveness while
not constraining our ideals and aspirations of making the world safe for
democracy will increase flexibility in assuring our national security. Our
strength over the long term rests with the ability to persuade rather than coerce.
The United States will maintain the most capable armed forces in the history of
the world, in order to pursue our tradition of peace through strength. America
will lead the international order through our ideals and cooperation, not just
our military might, to solve geopolitical problems.
The security of the United States in today’s globalizing world order increasingly
ties our interests with our allies and adversaries. Access to strategic resources
and pathways for trade combined with our desire for foreign citizens to freely
express themselves democratically will not always align. We must abide by
democratic principles at home and pursue our national strategic interests while
peacefully promoting democracy and human rights elsewhere.
This document details the international environment the United States faces
moving forward and depicts how we can navigate a peaceful and stable order in
the future by leading the global economy, protecting critical global strategic
interests, and maximizing the disposition and strength of our military.
Furthermore, the analysis of emerging and persistent national security issues –
cyberspace, terrorism, and nuclear weapons – emphasizes the opportunity of
American leadership.
2
Leading the International Order
Supporting an international system beneficial to U.S. interests, but neither
dependent on nor hostile to, U.S. global predominance.
The world order is in continual flux1; the close of the Cold War, September 11th,
and the Arab Spring show how much the world can change in a generation.
Consequently, United States’ policy has changed to meet the new demands on
our power and influence. We should expect this change that proves the
pragmatism of our international policies. The main dynamic occurring in the
international system today is the shift in geopolitical center of gravity from the
Atlantic to the western Pacific. We are at an important inflection point in world
affairs and we possess the ability to determine our national future and influence
the international system to provide continued national security. Our
government and society should not fear change, but embrace the dynamism of
tomorrow to create global stability through American leadership and ideals.
Is this trend sustainable, or will geopolitics settle into a new multi-polar system
similar to that of the early 20th century? Must we guard against an inevitable
power struggle between major states?
The increased accessibility to information and global markets has made
volatility the norm. Though impossible to predict, it is likely that this trend will
continue, making uncertainty and change among a large number of states more
likely than a sustained conflict between a few, or just two, major international
powers. We should consider world power in changing degrees rather than a
static first, second, and third.
World hegemons have historically been able to encourage relatively peaceful
international systems. Since the end of the Second World War no major powers
have fought directly. Instead, Europe was rebuilt and integrated, nuclear war
was avoided, and global cooperation and integration pulled millions out of
poverty through trade and development. The ideological schism between
capitalism and communism did not prevent these accomplishments. The Arab
Spring has come about in the face of another ideological schism, but one for
which the extremists are losing capability and support. The empowerment of
people, though education, access to information, and economic prosperity are
the greatest weapons against extremist ideologies.
The United States is the strongest, most capable world power; rather than
fighting a fluctuating system however, an opportunity exists to encourage a
more stable international system, able to operate even as the world moves
toward greater multi-polarity. Policing the system and acting, as a sort of
‘security provider of last resort’ is overly burdensome for the United States, has
damaged our legitimacy abroad, and creates more geopolitical problems that it
solves. It is unlikely our influence will go unchallenged in strategically
important areas of the globe. States are now offered other models for
development beyond what is perceived as our model of westernization.
1 Hutchings 2003
3
A Shift from West to East and from States to Non-State Actors
The major trend inherent in this systemic flux reflects the rise of both China
and India. Their rise results primarily from developmental catching-up
inevitable in the globalizing world. As massive populations in both of these
countries come out of poverty, both China and India continue to experience
relatively strong economic growth, despite the global financial crisis. In addition
to growth, these countries are advancing technologically and militarily. It is
unavoidable then, assuming these trends persist, that our relative power will
decrease and that global influence will shift from West to East. The United
States will continue to have absolute advantage in critical areas of national
power.
The changing international power dynamics could be seen as a threat, but
should be embraced as an opportunity for regional stabilizers to relieve some of
the burden from taxpayers. Our strategy encourages China to use its own
influence in both Sudan and North Korea to promote greater stability and
human rights. China is now our main partner and competitor in shaping the
international system. After our own security, priority should be given to
minimizing the insecurities where feasible of major powers like China and India.
Neither a contained nor insecure China will be helpful in creating a stable
international system. The key is to further convince countries like China that
their prosperity is linked to global cooperation and trade.
China and India are not the only states on the rise. Other countries such as
Brazil, Russia, and South Africa show degrees of potential in shaping their
regional environments as well. Greater influence is not confined even to states
however. Non-state actors such as international businesses, non-governmental
organizations, regional organizations, and even digital communities are
becoming more influential in shaping global affairs. Our strategy accepts a
greater number of influential players and a changing center of geopolitical
gravity. Historical power centers will not necessarily remain the only important
ones, and though the state-system will remain, states will not necessarily be the
only influential players tomorrow. Accepting greater uncertainty and the need to
reform global institutions will prove challenging, but is in our national interest.
A Dispersion of Influence and Greater Uncertainty
This dispersion of influence results in increased uncertainty. The Arab Spring
exemplifies this uncertainty in two ways. First, individuals are gaining new
power to shape politics in authoritarian states, in large part due to the digital
age. Second, as events in Syria, Bahrain, and Iran show, substantial protests may
still fail to result in change as state leaders act in very different ways to
maintain power. The digital domain is a medium that can be used by all sides in
a conflict – whether this is to spread information, track information, or cut off
information.
In addition to the Arab Spring, continued success of developing economies
presents greater uncertainty as emerging economies gain greater influence. As
trade flows grow and fluctuate, new centers (both for production and
consumption) will gain influence internationally. Thus creative destruction of
4
markets will create further uncertainty – especially because scarce resources
hold the potential for tempting greater hostility between competitors.
This growing uncertainty will reward perception and flexibility more than
dogmatic policy commitments to foreign countries. Supporting greater human
rights and democracy, while an ultimate aim nonetheless, must be balanced with
how our action may lead to greater uncertainty. The United States suffered after
the invasion of Iraq was followed by a general implosion of order, and had to
react at high cost. In the future, especially concerning states like Iran and North
Korea, our policy must adequately weigh the potential costs of uncertainty.
Global Institutions
The major threat in the next four years will likely come from actors that remain
cut off from the global community. These actors are the primary source of
terrorism in terms of funding, weapons, and safe haven. States such as Iran and
North Korea are destabilizing as they pursue nuclear weapons and threaten
common good resources such as sea-lanes and oil. Our policy must champi
1
National Security Strategy 2013
Introduction & Guiding Principle
The United States will lead the international order as a nation first among
equals to encourage stability, foster economic growth, promote democratic
values, and protect global strategic interests.
Our nation is strongest when we adhere to the core values and interests of the
citizenry. The principle above should inform every citizen and government
official to understand our national priorities, policy positions, and decisions to
be made during the next four years. The international order has changed
significantly since the end of the Cold War, and will continue to do so. The
United States must prepare for a multilateral world where, while retaining our
military, economic, and cultural preeminence, we may be challenged by both
allies and adversaries. Therefore, Americans must adopt the view from within
and without that we are a nation “first among equals” to reflect the trends of
demographics, global finance, and military power.
Strategically limiting American hard power to maximize our effectiveness while
not constraining our ideals and aspirations of making the world safe for
democracy will increase flexibility in assuring our national security. Our
strength over the long term rests with the ability to persuade rather than coerce.
The United States will maintain the most capable armed forces in the history of
the world, in order to pursue our tradition of peace through strength. America
will lead the international order through our ideals and cooperation, not just
our military might, to solve geopolitical problems.
The security of the United States in today’s globalizing world order increasingly
ties our interests with our allies and adversaries. Access to strategic resources
and pathways for trade combined with our desire for foreign citizens to freely
express themselves democratically will not always align. We must abide by
democratic principles at home and pursue our national strategic interests while
peacefully promoting democracy and human rights elsewhere.
This document details the international environment the United States faces
moving forward and depicts how we can navigate a peaceful and stable order in
the future by leading the global economy, protecting critical global strategic
interests, and maximizing the disposition and strength of our military.
Furthermore, the analysis of emerging and persistent national security issues –
cyberspace, terrorism, and nuclear weapons – emphasizes the opportunity of
American leadership.
2
Leading the International Order
Supporting an international system beneficial to U.S. interests, but neither
dependent on nor hostile to, U.S. global predominance.
The world order is in continual flux1; the close of the Cold War, September 11th,
and the Arab Spring show how much the world can change in a generation.
Consequently, United States’ policy has changed to meet the new demands on
our power and influence. We should expect this change that proves the
pragmatism of our international policies. The main dynamic occurring in the
international system today is the shift in geopolitical center of gravity from the
Atlantic to the western Pacific. We are at an important inflection point in world
affairs and we possess the ability to determine our national future and influence
the international system to provide continued national security. Our
government and society should not fear change, but embrace the dynamism of
tomorrow to create global stability through American leadership and ideals.
Is this trend sustainable, or will geopolitics settle into a new multi-polar system
similar to that of the early 20th century? Must we guard against an inevitable
power struggle between major states?
The increased accessibility to information and global markets has made
volatility the norm. Though impossible to predict, it is likely that this trend will
continue, making uncertainty and change among a large number of states more
likely than a sustained conflict between a few, or just two, major international
powers. We should consider world power in changing degrees rather than a
static first, second, and third.
World hegemons have historically been able to encourage relatively peaceful
international systems. Since the end of the Second World War no major powers
have fought directly. Instead, Europe was rebuilt and integrated, nuclear war
was avoided, and global cooperation and integration pulled millions out of
poverty through trade and development. The ideological schism between
capitalism and communism did not prevent these accomplishments. The Arab
Spring has come about in the face of another ideological schism, but one for
which the extremists are losing capability and support. The empowerment of
people, though education, access to information, and economic prosperity are
the greatest weapons against extremist ideologies.
The United States is the strongest, most capable world power; rather than
fighting a fluctuating system however, an opportunity exists to encourage a
more stable international system, able to operate even as the world moves
toward greater multi-polarity. Policing the system and acting, as a sort of
‘security provider of last resort’ is overly burdensome for the United States, has
damaged our legitimacy abroad, and creates more geopolitical problems that it
solves. It is unlikely our influence will go unchallenged in strategically
important areas of the globe. States are now offered other models for
development beyond what is perceived as our model of westernization.
1 Hutchings 2003
3
A Shift from West to East and from States to Non-State Actors
The major trend inherent in this systemic flux reflects the rise of both China
and India. Their rise results primarily from developmental catching-up
inevitable in the globalizing world. As massive populations in both of these
countries come out of poverty, both China and India continue to experience
relatively strong economic growth, despite the global financial crisis. In addition
to growth, these countries are advancing technologically and militarily. It is
unavoidable then, assuming these trends persist, that our relative power will
decrease and that global influence will shift from West to East. The United
States will continue to have absolute advantage in critical areas of national
power.
The changing international power dynamics could be seen as a threat, but
should be embraced as an opportunity for regional stabilizers to relieve some of
the burden from taxpayers. Our strategy encourages China to use its own
influence in both Sudan and North Korea to promote greater stability and
human rights. China is now our main partner and competitor in shaping the
international system. After our own security, priority should be given to
minimizing the insecurities where feasible of major powers like China and India.
Neither a contained nor insecure China will be helpful in creating a stable
international system. The key is to further convince countries like China that
their prosperity is linked to global cooperation and trade.
China and India are not the only states on the rise. Other countries such as
Brazil, Russia, and South Africa show degrees of potential in shaping their
regional environments as well. Greater influence is not confined even to states
however. Non-state actors such as international businesses, non-governmental
organizations, regional organizations, and even digital communities are
becoming more influential in shaping global affairs. Our strategy accepts a
greater number of influential players and a changing center of geopolitical
gravity. Historical power centers will not necessarily remain the only important
ones, and though the state-system will remain, states will not necessarily be the
only influential players tomorrow. Accepting greater uncertainty and the need to
reform global institutions will prove challenging, but is in our national interest.
A Dispersion of Influence and Greater Uncertainty
This dispersion of influence results in increased uncertainty. The Arab Spring
exemplifies this uncertainty in two ways. First, individuals are gaining new
power to shape politics in authoritarian states, in large part due to the digital
age. Second, as events in Syria, Bahrain, and Iran show, substantial protests may
still fail to result in change as state leaders act in very different ways to
maintain power. The digital domain is a medium that can be used by all sides in
a conflict – whether this is to spread information, track information, or cut off
information.
In addition to the Arab Spring, continued success of developing economies
presents greater uncertainty as emerging economies gain greater influence. As
trade flows grow and fluctuate, new centers (both for production and
consumption) will gain influence internationally. Thus creative destruction of
4
markets will create further uncertainty – especially because scarce resources
hold the potential for tempting greater hostility between competitors.
This growing uncertainty will reward perception and flexibility more than
dogmatic policy commitments to foreign countries. Supporting greater human
rights and democracy, while an ultimate aim nonetheless, must be balanced with
how our action may lead to greater uncertainty. The United States suffered after
the invasion of Iraq was followed by a general implosion of order, and had to
react at high cost. In the future, especially concerning states like Iran and North
Korea, our policy must adequately weigh the potential costs of uncertainty.
Global Institutions
The major threat in the next four years will likely come from actors that remain
cut off from the global community. These actors are the primary source of
terrorism in terms of funding, weapons, and safe haven. States such as Iran and
North Korea are destabilizing as they pursue nuclear weapons and threaten
common good resources such as sea-lanes and oil. Our policy must champi
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