Game theoretic analysis of queueing systems is an important research direction of queueing theory. In
this paper, we study the service rate control problem of closed Jackson networks from a game theoretic
perspective. The payoff function consists of a holding cost and an operating cost. Each server optimizes its
service rate control strategy to maximize its own average payoff. We formulate this problem as a non-
cooperative stochastic game with multiple players. By utilizing the problem structure of closed Jackson
networks, we derive a difference equation which quantifies the performance difference under any two
different strategies. We prove that no matter what strategies the other servers adopt, the best response
of a server is to choose its service rates on the boundary. Thus, we can limit the search of equilibrium
strategy profiles from a multidimensional continuous polyhedron to the set of its vertex. We further
develop an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we derive the social optimum
of this problem, which is compared with the equilibrium using the price of anarchy. The bounds of the
price of anarchy of this problem are also obtained. Finally, simulation experiments are conducted to demonstrate the main idea of this paper.
1. Introduction
Queueing theory is a wellestablished methodology in the society of operations research. It can provide a fundamental tool to
study the dynamics of many service systems with resource
constraints, such as computer systems, communication networks,
production systems, and transportation systems. In a queueing
system, there widely exists the phenomena of the competition
for limited service resources among customers. Thus, the concept
of game theory provides a promising research direction for queue-
ing theory. Starting from the pioneering work by Naor in 1969
(Naor, 1969), the game theoretic study of queueing systems at-
tracts considerable research attention in the literature (Altman,