Because the sum of individual benefits ($19,000) is less than the cost of the project, the project resources would be worth more in other uses than in the particular use being considered. Suppose, however, that the project decision will be made at a referendum among the people in the community, with a simple majority required for passage. The referendum also includes the method to be used to finance the project: by an equal per capita tax (project cost divided by number of people in the community, or $4,000 per person). If the people in the community vote according to their individual net gain or loss from the project (as competed in table 1-2), it will be approved (three for, two against). Does voter approval make the project desirable for the community? Not at all, because the project misallocates resources: it consumes resources that have a greater value in other use. The majority vote may misallocate resources when used for public decisions, as may any technique that does not involve comparisons of social cost and social return