Virtue ethics
There is an approach to ethics called “virtue ethics”. The idea stems from Aristotle who
held, in the “Nichomachean Ethics”, that human nature is characterised by aim. Of all
of the aims the most important one is the “good”. It is thus that we could label virtue
ethics as teleological – governed by the ends to be achieved. In this analysis a person’s
soul is divided into two segments, the rational and the irrational. The rational part is
characterised by the intellectual virtues such as logic, truth, and evaluation: the
irrational part is characterised by desires and wants. Rather than reduce morals to
rights and wrongs the Aristotelean view prefers to cultivate the virtuous individual.
Importantly here, the point of seeking the “good” is character training, for others, and
for the civic body.
The term “virtue” does not have sufficient meaning of itself. The dictionary
definition of “moral excellence or goodness” tells us little and what is does tell us is a
bit tautological. A more analytical appraisal would include the moral virtues (such as
honesty and decency); the intellectual virtues (such as intelligence and curiosity); the
communal virtues (such as charity and respect for others); and the political virtues
(such as a respect for law and a belief in the common good). Seligman (2003) argued
that it is the exercise of virtues that produces happiness – an interesting twist on
Aristotelean virtue ethics. Indeed, we should consider that both change and ancestral
stability are essential components of felicity. Friedman made that point when he wrote
on globalisation; that it involves not only the development of communications, global
trade, and improved technology, but also the persistence of our tribal roots and
ancestral connections: a point that is captured in the title, The Lexus and the Olive Tree
(Friedman, 1999).