First, it can be argued that happiness is one component of a good life, but not
the only one. It seems reasonable to suppose that knowledge, virtue, and caring
relationships, for example, are also components of a good life. Happiness might
occur as the result of “flourishing” as a person, or it might be unrelated to
personal growth. Yet, we would not want to say that a slothful, bleak, or
impoverished life is a good life so long as one is content with one’s lot. Consider
someone—call him Fred—who never leaves his home and has no contact with
other people or with the outside world. Fred has a deck of cards and plays solitaire
all day long. Clearly, Fred has a bleak existence, and yet he might nevertheless be happy. Would we want to say, for that reason alone, that Fred has a good life?
Certainly we would pity Fred. But why would we pity him if he has a good life?
Second, it can be argued that happiness is not the most important thing in life.
For example, it can be argued that it is better to be moral than to be happy when
the two conflict, which implies that the moral life is a better life than a happy one.
If so, then happiness is not the most important thing in life. Or, to explore another
line of thought, it might be argued that if you see life for what it is, if you connect
with all the pain and suffering in the world, if you acknowledge the inevitability
of death, that whatever you might accomplish, however grand or noble, ultimately
fades—in short, if you live an “authentic” life without self-deception or delusion,
you cannot possibly be happy. And yet, it might reasonably be said, an authentic
life is a more worthwhile life, a more meaningful life, a better life than a happy
one. If this is true, then not only is happiness not a component of a good life, it
conflicts with other things that matter, and matter more deeply, in life.
Third, even though happiness may not be the most important thing in life, it
doesn’t follow that that happiness is not essential to having a good life. A deeply
moral life might be a better life than a shallowly happy life, but this doesn’t mean
that a moral life is a good life. An authentic life might be a better life than an
inauthentic one, but this doesn’t mean that an authentic life is a good life. If, as
seems reasonable to suppose, one cannot have a truly good life without being
happy, and if being happy conflicts with other essential components of a good life,
then, as pessimists argue, no life is good.