Second, under conditions of lack of compromise, it is more attractive for politicians to depoliticize a policy issue, and to insulate the issue from politics. One way to do this is to delegate the issue to an independent agency or expert committee. As such delegation also implies refraining from political control, one can expect degrees of political accountability to be lower. For the moment, these explanations are only hypotheses. Future studies of qualitative nature could revisit the relation between veto players and legislative detailedness, and could hence contribute to a better understanding of the effect of veto players. Furthermore, the analysis has not pointed to an effect of the complexity of the policy issue. Whilst previous research in France demonstrated that independent agencies which operate in more complex areas are granted more formal political independence, accountability arrangements of Dutch independent agencies are not affected by the complexity of the issue. As suggested before, this may either be because policy complexity plays less of a role in Dutch processes of delegation, or because the measure which has been used to measure policy complexity does not capture the concept very well in the Netherlands. Future research may be able to improve the operationalization of policy complexity, and may thus be able to offer a more definite answer to the question of the impact of complexity. Finally, two more findings call for attention. First, although the literature focusing on the delegation process in the Netherlands emphasizes the importance of ministerial patterns, the differences across ministries have not been found to matter much for the degree of formal political accountability. Only independent agencies linked to the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management are subject to significantly lower degrees of accountability.