This ‘provocation’ included British coercive measures, in particular, increasing control
over labour matters and trade unions. The argument that the MCP was pushed into a
corner and given little choice by these was put most strongly by New Zealand scholar
Michael Stenson.17 Stenson lists a formidable battery of British measures. There
included use of trespass laws to remove union organisers from rubber estates and
other commercial property from late 1947, thus giving the appearance that they
were siding with employers. In the same period, police fired on strikers and demonstrators
on a number of occasions, with resulting fatalities almost entirely on the
protesting side. There was also the selective use of banishment orders in Singapore
against union and communist organisers alleged to have encouraged sedition, or
violence, and who were not born locally. Finally, the MCP became aware in early
1948 that the government was discussing more restrictive union legislation, which
ultimately arrived in the form of the Trade Union Ordinance of 31 May 1948.The Ordinance banned Federations of Trade Unions, except those organised by
trade. This was aimed against communist control of the Pan Malayan Federation of
trade unions in Malaya, and the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions. It ordered
that Trade Union officials should have three years trade experience, again, attempting
to rule out many of the communists’ semi-professional organisers.
More recently, MCP Secretary-General Chin Peng has developed a similar line.
The background to this is Chin Peng’s emergence since the end of the Cold
War. In December 1989 the MCP signed a peace accord with Thai and Malaysian
representatives. Since then, Chin Peng has waged a campaign to publicise his version
of events, notably at an academic seminar in Canberra in 1999, and through a book.
The latter comprises Chin Peng’s story as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor, Alias
Chin Peng: My side of the story (2003). According to Chin Peng’s version of the
Emergency origins: ‘The decisive factor was the internal situation’, in other words
British repression. He emphasises the British refusal to listen to protests against the
dropping of more liberal citizenship proposals and of the Malayan Union
Constitution of 1946 and refusing to listen to the 1947 protests,18 the increase in
repression of labour organisation, and the new Trade Union legislation of May 1948.19
Elsewhere he states that ‘the prominent factor that influenced us, when we decided
to take up arms, was the British policy at the time. We felt we were being cornered,
gradually backed into the corner. We had nowhere to move. … Of course, the international
factor played some role, but not as decisive as that.’
20 He argues that, after
the ‘two camp’ theory was published in the Cominform journal of November 1947,
they nevertheless decided in December to continue the ‘united front’ policy. The communal
divisions in Malaya, and the people being ‘thirsty for peace’, made a change
seem wrong, despite the fact that it was the disgraced Lai Teck’s policy.
Chin Peng goes further, and dates the first real questioning of MCP policy to 31
January to 1 February 1948, when an unnamed ‘Politburo member’
raised the question … in Kuala Lumpur … He said I’m doubtful. Why? After three years
of peaceful struggle even though we could succeed in mobilising the masses, to organise
hartal, general strike and universal stoppage of shops and business. We even succeeded
to that extent, unprecedented in Malaya, the first time. We couldn’t force the British to
make a bit of concession. So what is the usefulness of continuing the peace struggle. That
sounded quite convincing. So all of us agreed to discuss the point he raised, not raised by
me. And next day, February first, in the process of discussing, we heard the booming
from the Padang, the artillery celebrating the set up of the Federation. We continued
to discuss, at last, more or less agreed we had to make a formal review of this policy.
But that was close to Chinese New Year, so we adjourned the meeting.