In response to problems like this,
Goodman argues for a different
view, claiming that classical Buddhists endorse a two-class objective list
axiology, according to which both worldly prosperity (or happiness) and
moral virtue are intrinsically valuable:
4
The Objective List View: Both worldly prosperity and
moral virtue are ultimate goods. In other words, only
world prosperity and moral virtue are intrinsically good;
everything else that counts as good is only instrumentally
good to the extent that it contributes to the attainment of
worldly prosperity or moral virtue.
Although Goodman is right to look beyond nirvāṇa, I think his
own view misses the mark. One reason Goodman’s Objective List View
falls short is that the Pāli Buddhist tradition cares about more than
worldly prosperity and moral virtue. In the Majjhima Nikāya, for instance,
we hear of a monk with a very bad memory who might also be a little
intellectually slow. We have no reason to think he’s a bad person, but we
also have no reason to think he’s either virtuous or prosperous.
As he neared a grove of trees, he met the Buddha coming
from it. The Buddha smiled and took his hand. Together
they went to a temple where two old monks were sweeping
the
floor.
The
Buddha
said
to
them:
“This
young
monk
will
live here with you from now on. Continue your