In addition to the accounting failures, Enron provided only minimal disclosure on its relations with the special purpose entities. The company represented to investors that it had hedged downside risk in its own illiquid investments through
transactions with special purpose entities. Yet investors were unaware that the special purpose entities were actually using Enron’s own stock and nancial guar- antees to carry out these hedges, so that Enron was not actually protected from
downside risk. Moreover, Enron allowed several key employees, including its chief nancial of cer Andrew Fastow, to become partners of the special purpose entities.
In subsequent transactions between the special purpose entities and Enron, these employees pro ted handsomely, raising questions about whether they had ful lled their duciary responsibility to Enron’s stockholders.
In addition to the accounting failures, Enron provided only minimal disclosure on its relations with the special purpose entities. The company represented to investors that it had hedged downside risk in its own illiquid investments through
transactions with special purpose entities. Yet investors were unaware that the special purpose entities were actually using Enron’s own stock and nancial guar- antees to carry out these hedges, so that Enron was not actually protected from
downside risk. Moreover, Enron allowed several key employees, including its chief nancial of cer Andrew Fastow, to become partners of the special purpose entities.
In subsequent transactions between the special purpose entities and Enron, these employees pro ted handsomely, raising questions about whether they had ful lled their duciary responsibility to Enron’s stockholders.
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