This paper investigates whether sell-side analysts and auditors identify and communicate
information about ‘low-quality’ earnings to investors. We measure earnings quality
using a refined version of the accruals technique employed by Sloan (1996).
Specifically, we show that firms with unusually high working capital accruals are more
likely to experience declines in subsequent earnings performance and SEC enforcement
actions for GAAP violations. We then investigate whether information about the
subsequent earnings declines is reflected in analysts’ earnings forecasts and whether
information about GAAP violations is reflected in auditors’ opinions. We find that sellside
analysts’ forecast errors are large and negative for firms with unusually high
accruals, consistent with analysts failing to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines.
We also find that firms with unusually high accruals are less likely to receive a qualified
opinion from their auditors, consistent with auditors failing to anticipate the increased
likelihood of GAAP violations.
Our evidence complements and reinforces the evidence provided in Sloan (1996). Sloan
demonstrates that stocks prices act ‘as if’ investors do not anticipate the subsequent stock
price declines associated with unusually high levels of accruals. However, a limitation of
Sloan’s study is that the relation between the predictable earnings declines and stock
prices could be attributable to unidentified risk factors or unknown research design flaws.
We provide direct evidence that sell-side analysts do not fully incorporate the predictable
subsequent earnings declines into their forecasts. We also show that auditors do not alert
2
investors to the increased incidence of GAAP violations associated with high accruals.
Our evidence suggests that even professional investment intermediaries who specialize in
interpreting accounting information do not identify and communicate information about
the subsequent earnings declines. Thus, our evidence supports the hypothesis that
investors do not fully anticipate the negative implications of unusually high accruals.
Our evidence also generates insights into the roles played by sell-side analysts and
auditors. One interpretation of our results is that sell-side analysts and auditors lack the
necessary sophistication to understand the future implications of high levels of accruals.
Another interpretation is that sell-side analysts and auditors collude with management to
inflate expectations of future earnings by inflating current accruals, current earnings and
forecasts of future earnings. Under either of the above interpretations, our results are
consistent with related research suggesting that earnings management can be used to
boost stock prices around events such as equity issuances [e.g., Rangan (1998), Teoh and
Wong (1998)]. Also, under either interpretation, our results call into question the quality
of the opinions provided by analysts and auditors.
This paper investigates whether sell-side analysts and auditors identify and communicateinformation about ‘low-quality’ earnings to investors. We measure earnings qualityusing a refined version of the accruals technique employed by Sloan (1996).Specifically, we show that firms with unusually high working capital accruals are morelikely to experience declines in subsequent earnings performance and SEC enforcementactions for GAAP violations. We then investigate whether information about thesubsequent earnings declines is reflected in analysts’ earnings forecasts and whetherinformation about GAAP violations is reflected in auditors’ opinions. We find that sellsideanalysts’ forecast errors are large and negative for firms with unusually highaccruals, consistent with analysts failing to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines.We also find that firms with unusually high accruals are less likely to receive a qualifiedopinion from their auditors, consistent with auditors failing to anticipate the increasedlikelihood of GAAP violations.Our evidence complements and reinforces the evidence provided in Sloan (1996). Sloandemonstrates that stocks prices act ‘as if’ investors do not anticipate the subsequent stockprice declines associated with unusually high levels of accruals. However, a limitation ofSloan’s study is that the relation between the predictable earnings declines and stockprices could be attributable to unidentified risk factors or unknown research design flaws.We provide direct evidence that sell-side analysts do not fully incorporate the predictablesubsequent earnings declines into their forecasts. We also show that auditors do not alert2investors to the increased incidence of GAAP violations associated with high accruals.Our evidence suggests that even professional investment intermediaries who specialize ininterpreting accounting information do not identify and communicate information aboutthe subsequent earnings declines. Thus, our evidence supports the hypothesis thatinvestors do not fully anticipate the negative implications of unusually high accruals.Our evidence also generates insights into the roles played by sell-side analysts andauditors. One interpretation of our results is that sell-side analysts and auditors lack thenecessary sophistication to understand the future implications of high levels of accruals.Another interpretation is that sell-side analysts and auditors collude with management toinflate expectations of future earnings by inflating current accruals, current earnings andforecasts of future earnings. Under either of the above interpretations, our results areconsistent with related research suggesting that earnings management can be used toboost stock prices around events such as equity issuances [e.g., Rangan (1998), Teoh andWong (1998)]. Also, under either interpretation, our results call into question the qualityof the opinions provided by analysts and auditors.
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