In Austin’s (1955) point of view, the illocutionary act is the focus and most important part of the Speech-act theory,
because the illocutionary force accounts for more than what the words mean. Many define the term "illocutionary
act" with reference to examples, saying for example that any speech act (like stating, asking, commanding, promising,
and so on) is an illocutionary act. This approach has generally failed to give any useful hints about what traits and
elements make up an illocutionary act; that is, what defines such an act. It is also often emphasised that Austin
introduced the illocutionary act by means of a contrast with other kinds of acts or aspects of acting: the illocutionary
act, he says, is an act performed in saying something, as contrasted with a locutionary act, the act of saying
something, i.e. the very utterance of a sentence; and also contrasted with a perlocutionary act, an act performed by
saying something, i.e. the effects or consequences of the sentence.
According to the conception adopted by Bach and Harnish in 'Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts' (1979),
an illocutionary act is an attempt to communicate, which they analyse as the expression of an attitude. Another
conception of the illocutionary act goes back to Schiffer's book 'Meaning' (1972, p. 103), in which the illocutionary
act is represented as just the act of meaning something.
According to a widespread opinion, an adequate and useful account of "illocutionary acts" has been provided by John
Searle (1969, 1955, 1979.). In recent years, however, it has been doubted whether Searle's account is well-founded. A
wide ranging critique is in FC Doerge (2006). Collections of articles examining Searle's account are: Burkhardt
(1990) and Lepore / van Gulick (1991).