where Ln_IAit = natural logarithm of information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask
spread in the secondary loan market; and ICDsit = an indicator variable that takes a value
of 1 if the firm disclosed any types of ICDs, 0 otherwise. Other variables are as defined in
‘‘Appendix’’.
In models 2 and 3, we compare the effect of strictness of the disclosure of ICDs under
both section 302 and section 404 on IA. Therefore, we use ICMWs as an indicator variable
that takes a value of 1 if the firm disclosed ICMWs, and zero otherwise in model 2. We
also use Company-Level ICDs as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm
disclosed Company-Level ICDs, and zero otherwise in model 3. We expect the coefficients
on CL and ICMWs to be significant positive. We also add a set of control variables that
explain information asymmetry. Models 2 and 3 are described below: