The attempt to establish the field of psychohistory can be traced back to Freud himself. In various works, he tried to show the relevance of psychoanalysis for understanding both general historical problems (e.g. Totem and Taboo, 1913 and Civilization and its Discontents, 1930) and individual figures in history (Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, 1910). Although a few scholars tried to follow Freud's lead in the 1910s and 1920s by writing psychobiographies of famous historical figures, historians remained largely immune to psychoanalytic influence until after World War II. The rise of Hitler and National Socialism made explanations that emphasized irrational forces seem more compelling, and the author of a psychobiographical study of Hitler, William L. Langer, devoted his presidential address at the meeting of the American Historical Association in 1957 to urging historians to use the insights of depth psychology. The next year Erik H. Erikson published his widely reviewed psychoanalytic biography of Martin Luther (Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, 1958). Books, articles and dissertations in the field multiplied in the 1960s and 1970s. By the early 1970s, the Journal of Psychohistory had been founded, and a few history departments began to offer psychohistory as a field for doctoral study.
Yet even its most ardent defenders could not ignore the volleys of hostile criticism that soon erupted from all quarters. “Psycho-history is Bunk,” proclaimed the title of one typical attack. The author of a book devoted to arguing the defects of psychohistory proclaimed that “little, if any, psychohistory is good history.”1 Initially closely tied to Freud's version of psychoanalysis, psychohistorians too often shared Freud's dogmatic belief in the objective and scientific status of his claims. Lloyd deMause, founder of both the Institute for Psychohistory in New York and the Journal of Psychohistory, insisted, for example, that psychohistory is “specifically concerned with establishing laws and discovering causes in precisely the Hempelian manner [Hempel believed that history should aspire to be scientific]. The relationship between history and psychohistory is parallel to the relationship between astrology and astronomy.” Psychohistory is like astronomy, the real science. But when DeMause recounted how he gathered material from various epochs of history on the motivations that led to war and used his own self-analysis to penetrate the meaning of the material, he only seemed to be inflating his own subjective perceptions with scientific pretensions. And when he proclaimed that in this fashion he had discovered that psychohistory “is a process of finding out what we all already know and act upon,” he committed history's cardinal sin of anachronism.2 He assumed that what explained his motives in twentieth-century America was timeless and could explain motivation at any other time and place.
Perhaps most damaging, however, was the problem of evidence. Freud's conception of individual development emphasized infantile sexual feelings as the source of life-long psychological conflicts, but almost nothing is known about the infantile sexual feelings of any historical figure. As a result, critics frequently denounced psychohistorians' inferences from scanty evidence as unsupported speculation. In his study of Leonardo da Vinci, for example, Freud derived his entire analysis from one childhood memory reported by the Italian artist. Leonardo wrote in one of his scientific notebooks that he remembered “that while I was in my cradle a vulture came down to me, and opened my mouth with its tail, and struck me many times with its tail against my lips.”3 From this Freud inferred Leonardo's supposed homosexual feelings, his artistic interest in the figure of the Virgin Mary, embarrassment about his illegitimacy, his lifelong scientific curiosity, and even the smile on the Mona Lisa. In this and many other works of psychohistory, the conclusions seemed fantastic given the meager evidence available.
The derision and incredulity that had first greeted Freud spilled over onto psychohistory and only intensified with the renewed attacks on Freud's character and career in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s both psychohistory and Freud had fallen into a kind of grand canyon of intellectual disrepute. In a defense of Freud published in 1993, Paul Robinson referred to the “avalanche of anti-Freudian writings.” Some predicted that psychoanalysis would go the way of mesmerism and phrenology, discredited as bogus pseudo-science.4 The scholars associated with the Journal of Psychohistory soon found themselves buried under the criticism. One defender tried to save the field by disassociating it from the journal. According to William McKinley Runyan, the Journal of Psychohistory contained so many deeply flawed articles that “it has been a public relations embarrassment for the wider field.”5
The most adamant defenses of psychohistory inadvertently played into the hands of the critics. In a 1987 article on “The Perilous Purview of Psychohistory” in the Journal of Psychohistory, for example, Casper G. Schmidt glossed over the difficulty of finding evidence about infantile sexual feelings and reduced all intellectual criticisms of the field to psychological motives. He insisted that resistance to psychohistory came from fears of getting in touch with “the deepest madness of the human mind,” anxieties about “facing unbearable despair” caused by the dreadful record of human history, guilt about the human potential for primitive and destructive behavior, and intense shame about human imperfections. As if to substantiate charges that psychohistorians tended to present an ahistorical view of the past, he rashly proclaimed that good parents were “so pitifully scarce” in history “as not to be found often in most centuries before the present one.”6 Schmidt's defense only succeeded in making the defects of psychohistory more glaring.
Even the most subtle and sophisticated historians working in the vein uncovered by Freud and psychoanalysis found themselves forced to take a defensive posture. Peter Gay, for example, who undertook psychoanalytic training, wrote extensively about Freud, and used Freudian insights in his work, insisted that his “continuing sensitivity to the impact of social, political, [and] economic realities on the mind” made him “hesitate to call myself a psychohistorian; rather I like to think of myself as a historian informed by psy-choanalysis.”7 Gay tried to pick his way carefully around the question of culture (the historically changing) vs. nature (the timeless in human motivation). “The argument proclaiming man's cultural nature enshrines an important truth,” he admits, “but, as Freud asserted over and over, not the whole truth. Psychoanalysts have never withdrawn their attention from the individual's unique-ness.”8 In this way, Gay too linked psychoanalysis with those traits in the individual that resist culture and by implication with what resists historical change. He had not resolved the central dilemma of psychohistory: how could historians, who by definition studied the changes in human life, use an approach that emphasized the timeless?
In all fairness, it must be granted that the deck was stacked against psychohistory from the start. Historians viewed psychological theories with distrust, but psychologists usually ignored history altogether in their eagerness to establish their scientific credentials. Psychology traces its origins as a science to Wilhelm Wundt, who opened an experimental laboratory for psychology at the University of Leipzig in 1879. Although Wundt himself expressed an interest in the cultural influences on psychological processes (Völkerpsychologie), his followers opted instead for Wundt's experimental physiological model of psychological research. Psychologists emphasized the biological foundations of psychology, relied on studies of behavior carried out in the laboratory setting, preferred quantitative methods of investigation, neglected biographical tools, and ignored most forms of social and cultural, not to mention historical, explanation. Psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on early childhood sexual feelings and clinical study of individual cases in a therapeutic setting, never fitted comfortably into this vision of psychology as a discipline. Although Freud believed that psychoanalysis could give psychiatry “its missing psychological foundation” and urged its inclusion in the curriculum of medical schools, psychoanalysis never established an enduring institutional base in universities or mental hospitals.9 Disputes among Freudians themselves over the proper interpretation of Freud's work and the rapid multiplication of alternative psychological forms of clinical analysis also threatened the legitimacy of psychoanalysis, even within the clinically oriented community of psychologists.
Recent trends in psychology and psychiatry have in some ways pulled these fields even further away from history. The rising prominence of drug therapies as treatments for psychiatric disorders and the burgeoning of cognitive and neuroscience studies have resulted in a de-emphasis on personal subjectivity in favor of the objective factors of brain chemistry. Jeffrey Prager, a sociologist and practicing psychoanalyst, calls this de-emphasis “the death of the mind.”10 Both the natural and social sciences have come to view individual subjectivity as a red herring, a kind of mirage with no real substance. The self, according to Michael S. Gazzaniga, one proponent of this position, is an illusion or a fiction, the illusion that we are in charge of our lives. Mind, which Gazzaniga equates with consciousness, plays a very small role because ninety-eight percent of brain activity takes place outside of conscious awareness. As a consequence, for Gazzaniga “psychology itse
ความพยายามที่จะสร้างเขตข้อมูลของ psychohistory สามารถติดตามกลับไป Freud เอง ในงานต่าง ๆ เขาพยายามที่จะแสดงความเกี่ยวข้องของ psychoanalysis สำหรับทำความเข้าใจปัญหาประวัติศาสตร์ทั่วไป (เช่น Totem และ ห้าม ค.ศ. 1913 และอารยธรรม และ Discontents ของ 1930) และตัวเลขแต่ละตัวในประวัติศาสตร์ (Leonardo ดาวินชีและเป็นหน่วยความจำของพระเด็ก 1910) แม้ว่านักวิชาการกี่พยายามทำตามเป้าหมายของ Freud ใน 1910s ในปี 1920 โดยเขียน psychobiographies ของภาพประวัติศาสตร์ที่มีชื่อเสียง นักประวัติศาสตร์ยังคงใหญ่สร้างอิทธิพล psychoanalytic จนกระทั่งหลังจากสงครามโลกครั้งที่สอง เพิ่มขึ้นของฮิตเลอร์และสังคมนิยมแห่งชาติได้คำอธิบายที่เน้นจำนวนอตรรกยะกองกำลังดู ผลยิ่ง และผู้เขียนศึกษา psychobiographical ของฮิตเลอร์ William L. Langer ทุ่มเทที่อยู่ของประธานาธิบดีในการประชุมของสมาคมประวัติศาสตร์อเมริกันทั้งเพื่อกระตุ้นให้นักประวัติศาสตร์ใช้ข้อมูลเชิงลึกของจิตวิทยาความลึก Erik H. Erikson ประกาศเขาอย่างกว้างขวางในปีถัดไปตรวจสอบประวัติ psychoanalytic ของมาร์ตินลูเธอร์ (ลูเธอร์คนหนุ่มสาว: ศึกษา A Psychoanalysis และประวัติ 1958) หนังสือ บทความ และ dissertations ในฟิลด์คูณในช่วงปี 1960 และทศวรรษ 1970 โดยในช่วงทศวรรษ 1970 สมุด Psychohistory ได้ถูกก่อตั้งขึ้น และแผนกประวัติกี่เริ่มให้ psychohistory เป็นเขตศึกษาเอกYet even its most ardent defenders could not ignore the volleys of hostile criticism that soon erupted from all quarters. “Psycho-history is Bunk,” proclaimed the title of one typical attack. The author of a book devoted to arguing the defects of psychohistory proclaimed that “little, if any, psychohistory is good history.”1 Initially closely tied to Freud's version of psychoanalysis, psychohistorians too often shared Freud's dogmatic belief in the objective and scientific status of his claims. Lloyd deMause, founder of both the Institute for Psychohistory in New York and the Journal of Psychohistory, insisted, for example, that psychohistory is “specifically concerned with establishing laws and discovering causes in precisely the Hempelian manner [Hempel believed that history should aspire to be scientific]. The relationship between history and psychohistory is parallel to the relationship between astrology and astronomy.” Psychohistory is like astronomy, the real science. But when DeMause recounted how he gathered material from various epochs of history on the motivations that led to war and used his own self-analysis to penetrate the meaning of the material, he only seemed to be inflating his own subjective perceptions with scientific pretensions. And when he proclaimed that in this fashion he had discovered that psychohistory “is a process of finding out what we all already know and act upon,” he committed history's cardinal sin of anachronism.2 He assumed that what explained his motives in twentieth-century America was timeless and could explain motivation at any other time and place.อาจจะเสียหายมากที่สุด อย่างไรก็ตาม ได้ของหลักฐาน พัฒนาแต่ละแนวความคิดของ Freud เน้นความรู้สึกทางเพศ infantile เป็นแหล่งที่มาของความขัดแย้งในจิตใจตลอดชีวิต แต่แทบไม่มีอะไรเป็นที่รู้จักเกี่ยวกับความรู้สึกทางเพศ infantile ของเลขใด ๆ ทางประวัติศาสตร์ ดัง นักวิจารณ์มักประณาม psychohistorians' inferences จากหลักฐาน scanty เป็นเก็งกำไรไม่ ในการเขาศึกษาของดาวินชี Leonardo เช่น Freud มาวิเคราะห์ของเขาทั้งหมดจากหน่วยความจำวัยเด็กหนึ่งที่รายงาน โดยศิลปินชาวอิตาลี Leonardo เขียนในสมุดบันทึกทางวิทยาศาสตร์ของเขาที่เขาจดจำ "ว่า ในขณะที่ผมอยู่ในอู่ของฉัน แร้งมาลงกับฉัน และเปิดปากของฉัน ด้วยหาง และหลงหลายครั้ง ด้วยหางกับริมฝีปากของฉัน" 3 จากนี้ Freud สรุปของ Leonardo ควรรู้สึกเกย์ สนใจศิลปะในรูปของเวอร์จินแมรี ความลำบากใจเกี่ยวกับ illegitimacy ของเขา เขาเห็นวิทยาศาสตร์รอง และแม้แต่รอยยิ้มบนโมนาลิซา ในนี้และผลงานอื่น ๆ ของ psychohistory บทสรุปดูเหมือนสถานให้มีหลักฐานไม่เพียงพอDerision และความกังขาที่มีแรกรับการต้อนรับ Freud หกมากกว่าบน psychohistory และ intensified เท่า กับการโจมตีใหม่ของ Freud อักขระและอาชีพในทศวรรษ 1970 และทศวรรษที่ 1980 โดยปี 1990 psychohistory และ Freud ได้ตกลงเข้าของแกรนด์แคนยอนของปัญญาผู้เสียคน ในการป้องกันของ Freud เผยแพร่ในปี 1993 โรบินสัน Paul อ้างถึง "หิมะถล่มของ Freudian ต่อต้านงานเขียน" บางคนคาดการณ์ว่า psychoanalysis จะไปแบบ mesmerism และ phrenology, discredited เป็นปลอมหลอก-science.4 นักวิชาการที่เกี่ยวข้องกับสมุด Psychohistory เร็ว ๆ นี้พบตัวเองที่ฝังอยู่ภายใต้การวิจารณ์ กองหลังหนึ่งพยายามบันทึกฟิลด์ โดยแยกความสัมพันธ์จากสมุดรายวัน ตาม William McKinley Runyan สมุด Psychohistory อยู่หลายบทความลึก flawed ว่า "จะได้รับความลำบากใจในการประชาสัมพันธ์สำหรับฟิลด์กว้าง" 5The most adamant defenses of psychohistory inadvertently played into the hands of the critics. In a 1987 article on “The Perilous Purview of Psychohistory” in the Journal of Psychohistory, for example, Casper G. Schmidt glossed over the difficulty of finding evidence about infantile sexual feelings and reduced all intellectual criticisms of the field to psychological motives. He insisted that resistance to psychohistory came from fears of getting in touch with “the deepest madness of the human mind,” anxieties about “facing unbearable despair” caused by the dreadful record of human history, guilt about the human potential for primitive and destructive behavior, and intense shame about human imperfections. As if to substantiate charges that psychohistorians tended to present an ahistorical view of the past, he rashly proclaimed that good parents were “so pitifully scarce” in history “as not to be found often in most centuries before the present one.”6 Schmidt's defense only succeeded in making the defects of psychohistory more glaring.Even the most subtle and sophisticated historians working in the vein uncovered by Freud and psychoanalysis found themselves forced to take a defensive posture. Peter Gay, for example, who undertook psychoanalytic training, wrote extensively about Freud, and used Freudian insights in his work, insisted that his “continuing sensitivity to the impact of social, political, [and] economic realities on the mind” made him “hesitate to call myself a psychohistorian; rather I like to think of myself as a historian informed by psy-choanalysis.”7 Gay tried to pick his way carefully around the question of culture (the historically changing) vs. nature (the timeless in human motivation). “The argument proclaiming man's cultural nature enshrines an important truth,” he admits, “but, as Freud asserted over and over, not the whole truth. Psychoanalysts have never withdrawn their attention from the individual's unique-ness.”8 In this way, Gay too linked psychoanalysis with those traits in the individual that resist culture and by implication with what resists historical change. He had not resolved the central dilemma of psychohistory: how could historians, who by definition studied the changes in human life, use an approach that emphasized the timeless?In all fairness, it must be granted that the deck was stacked against psychohistory from the start. Historians viewed psychological theories with distrust, but psychologists usually ignored history altogether in their eagerness to establish their scientific credentials. Psychology traces its origins as a science to Wilhelm Wundt, who opened an experimental laboratory for psychology at the University of Leipzig in 1879. Although Wundt himself expressed an interest in the cultural influences on psychological processes (Völkerpsychologie), his followers opted instead for Wundt's experimental physiological model of psychological research. Psychologists emphasized the biological foundations of psychology, relied on studies of behavior carried out in the laboratory setting, preferred quantitative methods of investigation, neglected biographical tools, and ignored most forms of social and cultural, not to mention historical, explanation. Psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on early childhood sexual feelings and clinical study of individual cases in a therapeutic setting, never fitted comfortably into this vision of psychology as a discipline. Although Freud believed that psychoanalysis could give psychiatry “its missing psychological foundation” and urged its inclusion in the curriculum of medical schools, psychoanalysis never established an enduring institutional base in universities or mental hospitals.9 Disputes among Freudians themselves over the proper interpretation of Freud's work and the rapid multiplication of alternative psychological forms of clinical analysis also threatened the legitimacy of psychoanalysis, even within the clinically oriented community of psychologists.Recent trends in psychology and psychiatry have in some ways pulled these fields even further away from history. The rising prominence of drug therapies as treatments for psychiatric disorders and the burgeoning of cognitive and neuroscience studies have resulted in a de-emphasis on personal subjectivity in favor of the objective factors of brain chemistry. Jeffrey Prager, a sociologist and practicing psychoanalyst, calls this de-emphasis “the death of the mind.”10 Both the natural and social sciences have come to view individual subjectivity as a red herring, a kind of mirage with no real substance. The self, according to Michael S. Gazzaniga, one proponent of this position, is an illusion or a fiction, the illusion that we are in charge of our lives. Mind, which Gazzaniga equates with consciousness, plays a very small role because ninety-eight percent of brain activity takes place outside of conscious awareness. As a consequence, for Gazzaniga “psychology itse
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