Sri Lanka’s religious demographics are contested, and
due to inaccessibility of areas formerly under the control
of Tamil rebels, official census results do not exist for the
entire island. Estimates generally state that Sinhalese Buddhists make up approximately 74 percent of the national
population. The Tamil minority is actually divided ethnically between Tamils of Sri Lankan descent (4 to 12 percent) and Tamils of Indian decent, who were brought from
the mainland to work on plantations during British rule.
The Indian Tamil estimate is likely accurate because this
ethnic group lives primarily in regions of the country under government control. The Sri Lankan Tamil estimate is
more disputed because it is unknown how many may have
fled the country since hostilities broke out between the
LTTE and the government in 1983.
While Buddhists and Hindus make up the vast majority
of Sri Lanka’s population of 20 million, there are significant Muslim and Christian populations, which reflect Sri
Lanka’s long history of international trade and colonial
rule. Muslims and Christians each make up approximately
7 percent of Sri Lanka’s population, with many Christians
living in areas previously under LTTE control and with
strong ties to Tiger rebels.
Two additional trends in demographics are important to
consider when analyzing the role of religion in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. First, Sri Lanka is a case of a “double minority.” Tamils are a minority on the island as a whole, and
feel threatened by Sinhalese dominance in the government
and the exclusivist ethnic, linguistic, and religious character
of Sinhalese nationalism. The desire for self-determination
reflects the belief that only within a regionally devolved
or federal government can Tamils hopes to control any of
the governmental structures. At the same time, the Sinhalese community, while a majority on the island, perceives
ethnic threat in the massive Tamil-Hindu communities of
South India, particularly the 54 million Tamils living in
Tamil Nadu, just off Sri Lanka’s northwest coast. Hence,
the government of Sri Lanka has explicitly tried to alter
population patterns on the island. From independence
through the 1960s, resettlement packages encouraged
Sinhalese to move to the east of Sri Lanka, into territory
that had previously been dominated by Tamils. This policy
advanced to such a point that political redistricting could
create the Ampara district from land once included in the
Tamil Batticaloa district. The Eastern Province was hotly
contested by government and Tamil rebel forces until won
by the former in 2008; Muslims make up almost a third of
its population.
Somewhat surprisingly, nearly a quarter century of civil
conflict has not destroyed the Sri Lankan economy, though
it did weaken it. Since the ceasefire of 2002, the economy
has grown at an impressive rate but has slowed recently,
dropping from a 6.8 percent real GDP growth rate in 2007
to 3.5 percent in 2009. Lower growth before the ceasefire
agreement drove high unemployment, as high as 20 percent
in 1992. However, fighting in the densely populated Jaffna
Peninsula frustrated efforts at economic development, with
severe consequences for the local populace. LTTE leaders
did not guarantee the safe passage of government aid shipments and used local populations as shields for its guerilla
activities.
Nonetheless, Sri Lanka is one of the regional bright spots
for human development despite the violent conflict. The
UN’s 2010 Human Development Index ranks Sri Lanka
ninety-first, well ahead of India (119) and Bangladesh
(129). Despite the conflict, life expectancy at birth is 74.4
years and it has an adult literacy rate of 90.8 percent that
is closely tied to the intense focus on education from thegovernment since independence from British rule, including free public education from kindergarten through university. This reflects the open, universalistic nature of traditional Buddhist education as opposed to the traditional,
caste-based, restricted literacy among Hindus.
In conclusion, Sri Lanka’s bloody civil war was an ethnonationalist insurgency wherein various communities
defined themselves and their antagonists by ethnicity and
faith tradition. The LTTE was primarily a secular, nationalist movement that became increasingly brutal over time;
the government tended to align and define itself solely
in terms of Sinhalese nationalism, for which defense of
Buddhist heritage and identity are important obligations.
The conflict was made more complicated by the presence
of Muslims and Christians who were often caught in the
crossfire, and, most importantly, the looming potential of
Hindu-dominant India to exert influence over Sinhalese
affairs. External voices had little long term impact on the
conflict, which ended in a classic battlefield defeat for the
LTTE, allowing the government almost free reign to impose a post-war order of its choosing. Although undoubtedly the life of the population, including most Tamils, is
better now that the war is over, many of the longstanding
grievances have not been fully addressed. Furthermore,
Colombo faces international scrutiny for its sometimes
heavy-handed tactics, despite the fact that the war is over.