TThis paper investigates whether the initiation of trading in credit default swaps (CDSs) on
a borrowing firm's outstanding debt is associated with a decline in that firm's reporting
conservatism. CDS investments can modify lenders' payoffs on their loan portfolios by
providing insurance on negative credit outcomes. The onset of CDS trading reduces
lenders' incentives to continuously monitor borrowers and also their demand that
borrowers report conservatively. Additionally, borrowers expect CDS-insured lenders to
be more intransigent in renegotiations triggered by defaults and covenant violations.
Since conservatism can trigger earlier covenant violations, borrowers have heightened
incentives to report less conservatively in the post-CDS period. Using a differences-indifferences
research design, we observe a decline in borrowing firms' reporting conservatism
after CDS trade initiation. This effect is more pronounced when reputation costs
lenders face from reducing monitoring are lower, when debt contracts outstanding at the
time of CDS trade initiation have more financial covenants, and when lenders who
monitor borrowers more regularly in the pre-CDS period enter into CDS contracts to
hedge their credit exposures.