The WTO Ministerial declaration had so far been based on a ‘consensus’ arrived at after attempt the round of negotiations. At Nairobi too, the negotiations were extended by a day, but the final declaration for the first time explicitly stated the differences in as clear terms as possible. Para 34 of the Nairobi declaration, for instance, states “some wish to identify and discuss other issues for negotiations; while others do not.”
This is certainly a departure from the past where the outcomes were binding and carried a penalty for any violations. I have never seen any mention of the divergent views/claims over the huge agricultural subsidiesเงินอุดหนุน being doled outเจียด/ออก by US/EU to its farmers in any of the earlier declarations. Even at the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, where the developed countries had wanted to talk about newer issues which benefitted them while the developing countries were insisting on finishing the contentious pending issues revolving around agriculture, both the divergent views were not mentioned in the final draft. Instead, the talks failed because there was no unanimous decision.
Again, at Geneva in 2008, when the US was not willing to ‘negotiate’ on cotton subsidies, it torpedoedฉลองชัย the talks which had almost reached the final flashpoint. In the final hours, India had succumbed over its demand for a Special Safeguard Measures (SSM) — to protect its domestic farming sector against any surge in cheaper imports – by agreeing to an alternate route. The next point, and the final, on the negotiating table were US cotton subsidies. The US had refused to even talk about cotton subsidies, and instead of stating this in the final draft, it preferred to walk out blaming India for the fiasco. The world was waiting with abated breath for the final outcome, long overdue, but the talks collapsed.