As Niskalp’s losses continued to rise in 2001, Tata Finance used one final measure
in a desperate attempt to resolve, or at least conceal, its rapidly deteriorating final!‘
cial condition. The company chose to “desubsidiarise Niskalp, allegedly l0 P1'°te‘3t ‘E54
own balance sheet by not having to disclose the losses of its subsidiary HYIY more-
This stopgap measure tailed to remedy Tata Finance’s underlying financial P1’°blem=
namely, its lack of adequate equity capital. Pendse then tumed to his superiors at the
Tata Group who provided the equity capital needed to rescue Tata Finance. Shortly
after Tata F inance’s true financial conditionwas revealed to the public, the Tata
Group dismissed Dilip Pendse and four of his key subordinates. in August 2001, the
Tata Group filed a complaint with law enforcement authorities charging Pendse with
criminal breach of trust. Two months later, the remaining members of Tata Finance’s
board resigned as did the company’s audit firm, S. B. Billimoria & Co.
When the details of the Tata accounting scandal were revealed, the Indian busi-
ness press immediately pointed out that the accounting gimmicks used by Tata"
Finance were very similar to abusive accounting methods used by Enron in the
United States. Like the Enron debacle, Tata Finance’s independent audit firm faced
heated criticismfrom the business press for failing to uncover and stop those abusiee
accounting methods. When asked to comment on the Tata scandal, S. B. Billimoria’s
managing partner noted, “Operating under the constraints oi time and cost we
presumeull honesty from our clients. After all, an audit is not an investigation