Indeed, queries were raised at a high level from reputable sources, and even included a query on
27th January 1995 from the Bank for International Settlements in Basle. These rumours persisted in
February.
Also on 27th January, the head of Barings settlements and back‐office received a letter from SIMEX
warning of a £74 million shortfall
Between 19th January and 23rd February, the Barings Group apparently unquestioningly had
transferred £550 million to Singapore to support Leeson’s unauthorised SIMEX positions.
In mid‐February the seconded senior settlements clerk from London discovered a £190 million black
hole in the Singapore accounts.
On 23rd February, in Singapore, Leeson is confronted with the problem and walks out of a meeting.
On the Monday after the crisis broke the Chairman of Barings, Peter Barings, said in London that
”Barings’ derivative arbitrage operations had been very profitable and that in terms of its financial
exposures it was in principal a low risk business until the fraud took place”.
By the end of February, Barings had collapsed