Quite often, repo rates on specific on-the-run
issues are lower than overnight lending rates collateralized
by similar securities. The difference
between that overnight lending rate and the repo rate
(collateralized by the specific security) measures the
degree of “specialness” of that specific security; owners
of securities on special can obtain overnight loans at a
lower rate than those of other comparable securities.
The occurrence of specials in the repo market is a common
phenomenon and could be an outcome of the auction
process itself. Dealers who have short positions in
the when-issued market and fail to obtain the desired
amount of securities at the auction have to acquire the
securities either from the secondary cash market or
the repo market. Sufficiently high demand for a specific
security can increase the price and decrease the
repo rate on the specific security. Additionally, deliberate
acts of cornering an auction by an individual or a
cartel could result in short squeezes and specials, as
was the case with Salomon Brothers in the May 1991
two-year note auction.
Repeated short squeezes are potential threats to
the integrity and liquidity of the Treasury market and
eventually could drive up the Treasury’s borrowing costs.
Can the Treasury undertake credible measures to prevent
and alleviate short squeezes? Are alternative auction formats
more or less susceptible to short squeezes?