Although theory suggests small, young, privately held firms should have the greatest incentive
to engage in corporate risk management, there is currently little evidence of this, in that such
firms make almost no use of ‘traditional’ derivatives-based hedging strategies. In this paper I
examine an alternative margin along which firms manage market risk, by analyzing firms’ choices
between fixed and variable rate loans. First I develop a simple agency model in which both firms
and lenders are financially constrained. In equilibrium, banks charge a premium on fixed rate
debt to compensate them for assuming the interest rate risk of the loan. Firms who are likely
to be financially constrained in future periods will be willing to pay this premium, firms who
are likely to be unconstrained will not. I test these and other predictions using microeconomic
data on a sample of bank dependent US firms. Small firms and young firms (two measures of
financial constraints) as well as firms with higher growth rates, lower current cash flows and
less wealthy owners are significantly more likely to choose fixed rate debt. Firms also adjust
their exposure depending on how interest rate shocks covary with industry cash flows. I also
find evidence that lenders do charge a premium on fixed rate loans even after controlling for
the term premium. Finally, I provide supporting anecdotal evidence from a series of interviews
with business lenders and present some quantitative comparisons of the significance of this risk
management channel. I conclude that small US firms use the banking system to help manage
interest rate risk, and discuss implications for the balance sheet and bank lending channels of
monetary policy.