Thus much more should fall within the philosophy of mathematics than merely the
Justification of mathematical knowledge, provided through its reconstruction by a foundationist programme. Mathematics is multi-faected and as well as a body of propositional
Knowledge. It can be described in terms of its concepts, characteristics, history and practices. The philosophy of mathematics must account for this complexity, and we also need to ask the
Following qusions. What is the purpose of mathematics? What is the role of human beings in mathematics? How does the subjective knowledge of individuals become the objective knowledge of mathematics? How has mathematical knowledge evolved? How boes its history
Illuminate philosophy of mathematics? W hat is the relationship between mathematics and the
Other areas of human knowledge and experience? Why have the theories of pure mathematics
Proved to so powerful and useful in their applications to science and to practical problems?
These questions represent a broadening of the scope of philosophy of mathematics
From the internal concerns of absolutism. Three issues may be selected as being of particular
Importance, philosophically and educationally. Each of these issues is expressed in terms of
a dichotomy, and the absolutist and fallibilist perspectives on the issue are contrasted. The three issues are as follows.
First of all, there is the contrast between knowledge as a finished product, largely
Expressed as a body of propositions, and the activity of knowing or knowledge getting. This latter is concerned with genesis of knowledge, and with the contribution of humans to its
Crcation. As we have seen, absolutist views focus on the former, that is finished or
Published knowledge, and its foundations and justification. Absolutist views not only focus on
Knowledge as an objective product, they often deny the philosophical legitimacy of considering
The genesis of knowledge as all, and consign this to psychology and social sciences. One partial
Exception to this is constructivism, which admits the knowing agent in a stylized form.
In contrast, fallibilist views of the nature of mathematics, by acknowledging the role of error in mathematics cannot escape from considering theory replacement and the growth of know ledge. Beyond this , such views must be concerned with the human contexts of knowledge creation and the historical genesis of mathematics, if they are to account adequately for mathem ics, in all its fullness.
Because of the importance of the issue, it is worth adding a further and more general argument for the necessity for considcring the genesis of knowledge. This argument is based on the reality of knowledge growledge growth. As history illustrates, knowledge is basperpetually in a state of change in every discipline, including mathematics. Epistemology is not accounting adequately for knowledge if it concentrates only on a single static formulation, and ignores the dynamics of knowledge growth.It is like reviewing a film on the basis of a detailed scrutiny of asingle key frame! Thus epistemology must concern itself with the basis of knowing, with the underpins the dynamics of knowledge growth, as well as with the specific body of knowledge accepted at any one time.
Thus much more should fall within the philosophy of mathematics than merely the
Justification of mathematical knowledge, provided through its reconstruction by a foundationist programme. Mathematics is multi-faected and as well as a body of propositional
Knowledge. It can be described in terms of its concepts, characteristics, history and practices. The philosophy of mathematics must account for this complexity, and we also need to ask the
Following qusions. What is the purpose of mathematics? What is the role of human beings in mathematics? How does the subjective knowledge of individuals become the objective knowledge of mathematics? How has mathematical knowledge evolved? How boes its history
Illuminate philosophy of mathematics? W hat is the relationship between mathematics and the
Other areas of human knowledge and experience? Why have the theories of pure mathematics
Proved to so powerful and useful in their applications to science and to practical problems?
These questions represent a broadening of the scope of philosophy of mathematics
From the internal concerns of absolutism. Three issues may be selected as being of particular
Importance, philosophically and educationally. Each of these issues is expressed in terms of
a dichotomy, and the absolutist and fallibilist perspectives on the issue are contrasted. The three issues are as follows.
First of all, there is the contrast between knowledge as a finished product, largely
Expressed as a body of propositions, and the activity of knowing or knowledge getting. This latter is concerned with genesis of knowledge, and with the contribution of humans to its
Crcation. As we have seen, absolutist views focus on the former, that is finished or
Published knowledge, and its foundations and justification. Absolutist views not only focus on
Knowledge as an objective product, they often deny the philosophical legitimacy of considering
The genesis of knowledge as all, and consign this to psychology and social sciences. One partial
Exception to this is constructivism, which admits the knowing agent in a stylized form.
In contrast, fallibilist views of the nature of mathematics, by acknowledging the role of error in mathematics cannot escape from considering theory replacement and the growth of know ledge. Beyond this , such views must be concerned with the human contexts of knowledge creation and the historical genesis of mathematics, if they are to account adequately for mathem ics, in all its fullness.
Because of the importance of the issue, it is worth adding a further and more general argument for the necessity for considcring the genesis of knowledge. This argument is based on the reality of knowledge growledge growth. As history illustrates, knowledge is basperpetually in a state of change in every discipline, including mathematics. Epistemology is not accounting adequately for knowledge if it concentrates only on a single static formulation, and ignores the dynamics of knowledge growth.It is like reviewing a film on the basis of a detailed scrutiny of asingle key frame! Thus epistemology must concern itself with the basis of knowing, with the underpins the dynamics of knowledge growth, as well as with the specific body of knowledge accepted at any one time.
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