The interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies
Stijn Claessens, Fabian Valencia 14 March 2013
Inflation targeting once seemed sufficient, but the Global Crisis showed that maintaining financial stability and price stability requires more than the monetary-policy tool. We are witnessing the rise of macroprudential policy. This column discusses how monetary and macroprudential policies interact and what it means for policy and institutional design. Regardless of whether both policies are assigned to the same authority or to two authorities; separate decision-making, accountability and communication structures are required.
In the decades prior to the crisis, macroeconomic management evolved to assign a strong role to monetary policy, with a primary focus on price stability. The framework of monetary policy was broadly converging toward one with an inflation target (explicit or implicit) and a short-term interest rate as a tool (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro 2010). While boom-bust cycles in asset prices and credit were observed prior to the recent crisis, these did not seriously challenge the prevailing paradigm. Meanwhile, in most economies, prudential policies were focused narrowly on the soundness of individual firms.
Price stability, however, did not ensure macroeconomic stability (Figure 1). This means that additional tools will be helpful in complementing monetary policy in countercyclical management. The use of financial regulation focused on macro-financial risks: macroprudential policies emerge as candidates.
The newly emerging paradigm is one in which both monetary policy and macroprudential policies are used for countercyclical management: monetary policy primarily aimed at price stability; and macroprudential policies primarily aimed at financial stability. But these policies interact with each other and thus each may enhance or diminish the effectiveness of the other (Figure 2).
Studying interactions
In a recent paper (IMF 2012) we examine the conduct of both monetary and macroprudential policies in the presence of interactions. The paper first focuses on an ideal benchmark, in which both policies work perfectly in achieving their objectives, and then we address three additional questions:
• If macroprudential policies work imperfectly, what are the implications for monetary policy?
• If monetary policy is constrained, what is the role for macroprudential policies?
• If there are institutional and political economy constraints, how can macroprudential and monetary policies be adjusted?
Figure 1. Output-gap estimates, headline inflation, house price, and proportion of construction components
Source: World Economic Outlook and Haver Analytics.
Figure 2. Monetary and macroproduential policy interactions
Benchmark world, when policies work perfectly
When price rigidities are the only distortion, stabilising inflation is equivalent to maximising welfare (Woodford 2003). By keeping monetary policy focused on price stability, output stability is guaranteed and the best feasible outcome is obtained.
In the presence of financial market imperfections, individual behaviour is distorted, giving rise to excessive risk-taking ex ante – in the form of excessive leverage, large exposure to risky assets, and fragile liability compositions – and negative asset-price or exchange-rate externalities ex post. In short, boom-bust cycles are amplified (Bianchi 2011, Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2003, ibid. 2004, Lorenzoni 2008, Mendoza 2010, and Korinek 2010). Welfare maximisation then requires adding financial stability as an intermediate goal for policy, because financial instability signals distortions in the level and/or composition of output (Curdia and Woodford 2009; Carlstrom and Fuerst 2010) (see Figure 1).
While operationalising financial stability is not easy because of the large range of financial distortions and their changes over time, the task of preserving financial stability is nonetheless clear: mitigating financial distortions and the risks associated with them1.
Preserving financial stability
• Monetary policy alone cannot achieve financial stability because the causes of financial instability are not always related to the degree of liquidity in the system (which monetary policy can fix); Mitigating the effects of financial distortions or pricking an asset-price bubble can require large changes in the policy rate (Bean et al. 2010) and when financial distortions are more acute in some sectors of the economy than in others, monetary policy is too blunt a tool.
• The use of macroprudential policies primarily for managing aggregate demand may in fact create additional distortions by imposing constraints on behaviour beyond those areas where financial distortions originate; It is thus desirable, when both policies are available, to keep monetary policy primarily focused on price stability and macroprudential policies on financial stability.
Interactions
Monetary policy, however, has side effects that can affect financial stability when it pursues its primary objective:
• By shaping ex-ante risk-taking incentives of individual agents, through leverage, short-term borrowing, or foreign-currency borrowing;
• Or by affecting ex-post the tightness of borrowing constraints and possibly exacerbating asset-price and exchange-rate externalities and leverage cycles;
Macroprudential policies also have side effects. By constraining borrowing and hence expenditure in one or more sectors of the economy, macroprudential policies affect overall output.
These side effects imply that the new paradigm needs to take into account how the conduct of both policies is affected in the presence of their interactions:
• If macroprudential policies have strong effects on output, more accommodative monetary policy can offset these effects as necessary;
• If changes in the monetary stance affect incentives to take too much risk, the relevant macroprudential policies would need to be tightened;
A number of papers surveyed by the IMF (2012) support this conclusion. In particular, these models suggest that the optimal calibration of the reaction of monetary policy to output and inflation does not change markedly when macroprudential policy is also used, even when different types of shocks are considered. In other words, the sole presence of side effects has no major implications for the conduct of both policies, however, when policies operate perfectly.
These conclusions rely on important simplifications, namely that the macroprudential instruments are perfectly targeted, fully offset the financial shock or distortion, and are immune to time-inconsistency issues arising in part for reasons of political economy. Constraints on one policy may increase the burden on the other and additional distortions and political-economy factors can give rise to coordination issues.
(Continue Last page) Disclaimer: The views expressed in this column are the authors' and not necessarily those of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
Imperfect macroprudential policies
There are a number of reasons why macroprudential policies may not operate perfectly. Financial stability concerns are hard to capture in practice making it difficult to determine when macroprudential policies need to be loosened, or tightened. Limited knowledge on their quantitative impact makes calibration difficult. Similarly, it may be the case that addressing one distortion improves other manifestations of financial instability, or the other way around. Moreover, institutional constraints may impede the optimal deployment of macroprudential instruments. For instance, macroprudential policies can require, among others, cooperation and coordination with microprudential supervisory agencies, which may be legally or institutionally difficult.
These imperfections may themselves lead to imperfectly targeted or excessively tight macroprudential policies, implying a binding constraint in the wrong place or at the wrong time with negative consequences on welfare (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004)2. Tighter regulations can also create stronger incentives for circumvention, with the risk of vulnerabilities building up outside of the regulatory perimeter and policymakers’ sight.
Weaknesses in the application of macroprudential policies make it more likely that monetary policy may need to respond to financial conditions. Indeed, in models where macroprudential policy is absent or time invariant, but in the presence of financial sector distortions, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond to financial conditions, in addition to the output gap and deviations of inflation from target (see Curdia and Woodford 2009, Carlstrom and Fuerst 2010). By extension, to reduce the effects of imperfectly targeted or less effective macroprudential policy, it can be desirable for monetary policy to respond to financial conditions and ‘lend a hand’ in achieving financial stability (e.g., by ‘leaning’ against the credit cycle).
Constraints on monetary policy
In small open economies with exchange-rate pegs, the effective monetary stance can give rise to excessively strong incentives for risk-taking. In such cases, macroprudential policies will need to address the adverse side effects of monetary policy on financial stability3. Nonetheless, where monetary arrangements are not adequate, there is more to gain from strengthening monetary policy’s effectiveness than from using macroprudential policies as imperfect substitutes.
Where monetary policy is constrained, the demands on macroprudential policy will be greater. Just as it is optimal for monetary policy to respond directly to financial conditions when macroprudential policies are absent and when financial distortions have an effect in the composition of output, it is optimal for macroprudential policy to respond to aggregate demand when monetary and fiscal policy are constrained.
Institutional and
The interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies
Stijn Claessens, Fabian Valencia 14 March 2013
Inflation targeting once seemed sufficient, but the Global Crisis showed that maintaining financial stability and price stability requires more than the monetary-policy tool. We are witnessing the rise of macroprudential policy. This column discusses how monetary and macroprudential policies interact and what it means for policy and institutional design. Regardless of whether both policies are assigned to the same authority or to two authorities; separate decision-making, accountability and communication structures are required.
In the decades prior to the crisis, macroeconomic management evolved to assign a strong role to monetary policy, with a primary focus on price stability. The framework of monetary policy was broadly converging toward one with an inflation target (explicit or implicit) and a short-term interest rate as a tool (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro 2010). While boom-bust cycles in asset prices and credit were observed prior to the recent crisis, these did not seriously challenge the prevailing paradigm. Meanwhile, in most economies, prudential policies were focused narrowly on the soundness of individual firms.
Price stability, however, did not ensure macroeconomic stability (Figure 1). This means that additional tools will be helpful in complementing monetary policy in countercyclical management. The use of financial regulation focused on macro-financial risks: macroprudential policies emerge as candidates.
The newly emerging paradigm is one in which both monetary policy and macroprudential policies are used for countercyclical management: monetary policy primarily aimed at price stability; and macroprudential policies primarily aimed at financial stability. But these policies interact with each other and thus each may enhance or diminish the effectiveness of the other (Figure 2).
Studying interactions
In a recent paper (IMF 2012) we examine the conduct of both monetary and macroprudential policies in the presence of interactions. The paper first focuses on an ideal benchmark, in which both policies work perfectly in achieving their objectives, and then we address three additional questions:
• If macroprudential policies work imperfectly, what are the implications for monetary policy?
• If monetary policy is constrained, what is the role for macroprudential policies?
• If there are institutional and political economy constraints, how can macroprudential and monetary policies be adjusted?
Figure 1. Output-gap estimates, headline inflation, house price, and proportion of construction components
Source: World Economic Outlook and Haver Analytics.
Figure 2. Monetary and macroproduential policy interactions
Benchmark world, when policies work perfectly
When price rigidities are the only distortion, stabilising inflation is equivalent to maximising welfare (Woodford 2003). By keeping monetary policy focused on price stability, output stability is guaranteed and the best feasible outcome is obtained.
In the presence of financial market imperfections, individual behaviour is distorted, giving rise to excessive risk-taking ex ante – in the form of excessive leverage, large exposure to risky assets, and fragile liability compositions – and negative asset-price or exchange-rate externalities ex post. In short, boom-bust cycles are amplified (Bianchi 2011, Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2003, ibid. 2004, Lorenzoni 2008, Mendoza 2010, and Korinek 2010). Welfare maximisation then requires adding financial stability as an intermediate goal for policy, because financial instability signals distortions in the level and/or composition of output (Curdia and Woodford 2009; Carlstrom and Fuerst 2010) (see Figure 1).
While operationalising financial stability is not easy because of the large range of financial distortions and their changes over time, the task of preserving financial stability is nonetheless clear: mitigating financial distortions and the risks associated with them1.
Preserving financial stability
• Monetary policy alone cannot achieve financial stability because the causes of financial instability are not always related to the degree of liquidity in the system (which monetary policy can fix); Mitigating the effects of financial distortions or pricking an asset-price bubble can require large changes in the policy rate (Bean et al. 2010) and when financial distortions are more acute in some sectors of the economy than in others, monetary policy is too blunt a tool.
• The use of macroprudential policies primarily for managing aggregate demand may in fact create additional distortions by imposing constraints on behaviour beyond those areas where financial distortions originate; It is thus desirable, when both policies are available, to keep monetary policy primarily focused on price stability and macroprudential policies on financial stability.
Interactions
Monetary policy, however, has side effects that can affect financial stability when it pursues its primary objective:
• By shaping ex-ante risk-taking incentives of individual agents, through leverage, short-term borrowing, or foreign-currency borrowing;
• Or by affecting ex-post the tightness of borrowing constraints and possibly exacerbating asset-price and exchange-rate externalities and leverage cycles;
Macroprudential policies also have side effects. By constraining borrowing and hence expenditure in one or more sectors of the economy, macroprudential policies affect overall output.
These side effects imply that the new paradigm needs to take into account how the conduct of both policies is affected in the presence of their interactions:
• If macroprudential policies have strong effects on output, more accommodative monetary policy can offset these effects as necessary;
• If changes in the monetary stance affect incentives to take too much risk, the relevant macroprudential policies would need to be tightened;
A number of papers surveyed by the IMF (2012) support this conclusion. In particular, these models suggest that the optimal calibration of the reaction of monetary policy to output and inflation does not change markedly when macroprudential policy is also used, even when different types of shocks are considered. In other words, the sole presence of side effects has no major implications for the conduct of both policies, however, when policies operate perfectly.
These conclusions rely on important simplifications, namely that the macroprudential instruments are perfectly targeted, fully offset the financial shock or distortion, and are immune to time-inconsistency issues arising in part for reasons of political economy. Constraints on one policy may increase the burden on the other and additional distortions and political-economy factors can give rise to coordination issues.
(Continue Last page) Disclaimer: The views expressed in this column are the authors' and not necessarily those of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
Imperfect macroprudential policies
There are a number of reasons why macroprudential policies may not operate perfectly. Financial stability concerns are hard to capture in practice making it difficult to determine when macroprudential policies need to be loosened, or tightened. Limited knowledge on their quantitative impact makes calibration difficult. Similarly, it may be the case that addressing one distortion improves other manifestations of financial instability, or the other way around. Moreover, institutional constraints may impede the optimal deployment of macroprudential instruments. For instance, macroprudential policies can require, among others, cooperation and coordination with microprudential supervisory agencies, which may be legally or institutionally difficult.
These imperfections may themselves lead to imperfectly targeted or excessively tight macroprudential policies, implying a binding constraint in the wrong place or at the wrong time with negative consequences on welfare (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004)2. Tighter regulations can also create stronger incentives for circumvention, with the risk of vulnerabilities building up outside of the regulatory perimeter and policymakers’ sight.
Weaknesses in the application of macroprudential policies make it more likely that monetary policy may need to respond to financial conditions. Indeed, in models where macroprudential policy is absent or time invariant, but in the presence of financial sector distortions, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond to financial conditions, in addition to the output gap and deviations of inflation from target (see Curdia and Woodford 2009, Carlstrom and Fuerst 2010). By extension, to reduce the effects of imperfectly targeted or less effective macroprudential policy, it can be desirable for monetary policy to respond to financial conditions and ‘lend a hand’ in achieving financial stability (e.g., by ‘leaning’ against the credit cycle).
Constraints on monetary policy
In small open economies with exchange-rate pegs, the effective monetary stance can give rise to excessively strong incentives for risk-taking. In such cases, macroprudential policies will need to address the adverse side effects of monetary policy on financial stability3. Nonetheless, where monetary arrangements are not adequate, there is more to gain from strengthening monetary policy’s effectiveness than from using macroprudential policies as imperfect substitutes.
Where monetary policy is constrained, the demands on macroprudential policy will be greater. Just as it is optimal for monetary policy to respond directly to financial conditions when macroprudential policies are absent and when financial distortions have an effect in the composition of output, it is optimal for macroprudential policy to respond to aggregate demand when monetary and fiscal policy are constrained.
Institutional and
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