The final and most difficult objective of comparative politics is a logical extension
of hypothesis-testing, namely, to make predictions about outcomes in other countries
based on the generalizations from the initial comparison, or to make claims about
future political outcomes. Prediction in comparative politics tends to be made in
probabilistic terms, such as 'countries with systems of proportional representation
are more likely to have multiple political parties'. In this example, a political scientist
would know the likely effect of a nation switching its electoral system from a plurality
or 'first-past-the-post' rule to a proportional one (Hague et al. 1992). Another predictive
example involves the benefits accrued to political incumbents in contesting future
elections. Based on the empirical observations of past electoral contests, political
scientists could be reasonably secure in predicting that the incumbent in any given
election has a higher probability of winning the election than the non-incumbent
(see King et al. 1994).
Although prediction is less an aspiration of comparativists today than in the
past, there are those who continue to couch their arguments in predictive language.
For example, weak predictive arguments are found in Huntington's (1996) The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of the New World Order, and strong predictive
arguments are found in Vanhanen's (1997) The Prospect ofDemocracy. Huntington
(1996) identifies nine key cultural groupings which he believes currently characterize
the world's population, and predicts that future conflicts will be more likely to appear
in the areas where two or more of these cultures meet or 'clash'. Not only does he
seek to predict future conflicts in the world, but claims that his 'civilization' approach
accounts for more post-Cold War events than rival approaches. His predictions
became all the more relevant after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, which many saw as proof of a clash
between the 'Western' and 'Islamic' civilizations outlined in his book. Similarly,
based on observations of the presence of economic resources and the occurrence of
democracy in the world from the middle of the nineteenth century until today,
Vanhanen (1997: 99-154) predicts the degree to which individual countries and
regions in the world are likely to become democratic (see Briefing Box 1.3).