This paper tracks the progress of accruals accounting in
central government in the UK and RoI from the early 1990s.
While it seemed that a common journey to major accounting
change had commenced, the actual outcome of the
process was very different in the two jurisdictions. The UK
embedded accruals-accounting principles in its management
accounting and financial reporting systems, whereas
the RoI made fairly modest changes and fundamentally
retained cash-based systems.
Given the link between accruals accounting and NPM,
the varying trajectories of accounting change were perhaps
not unexpected. Hood (1995) identified the UK as
a high-intensity adopter, as opposed to the RoI being a
medium-intensity adopter, of NPM ideas, and the outcome
of the change process in the two countries aligns with these
classifications.Fromthe interviews, particularly from those
conducted in the RoI, and from earlier research (Mellett
et al., 2007), the UK approach with respect to accruals
accounting is portrayed as rather ideological, or perhaps
dogmatic, where positions are taken based on insufficiently
examined premises. By contrast, the RoI appears more
pragmatic whereby an idea or approach is assessed in terms
of its observable practical consequences. Coupled with this,
a more consensual culture of discussion and debate, in an
environment where concerns were increasingly emerging,
appears to have slowed, or even dissipated, enthusiasm in
the RoI. In particular, a realisation of the difficulty of sustaining
the change to accruals accounting on cost-benefit
grounds is clear from the UK interviews in this study (and
also in earlier Connolly and Hyndman, 2006, research).
Such information obviously filtered to those considering
change in the RoI (as was highlighted in the RoI interviews)
and this seemed to influence opinion.
Perhaps a surprising feature of this research is that the
RoI ostensibly appeared to commit itself to such a significant
and radical accounting change in the early 1990s.
An aspect of this appeared to be influenced by the ‘MSc
group’ of senior civil servants who visited New Zealand
and Australia. These individuals seemed to be convinced
by the potential benefits of accruals accounting (albeit that
none of this group was from a professional accountancy
background) and they sought to become influencers for
change within the RoI. However, the ability of this small
group of bureaucrats to maintain momentum was limited,
something anticipated from Carpenter and Feroz’s
(2001) research, as the impact of such a significant transformation
became more widely appreciated, and in the
more bottom-up, consensual RoI culture, the opportunity
to oppose or restrict change was given room to develop. In
addition, political forces remained peripheral to the arguments,
while the more administrative ‘centre’ (possibly
best represented by the Department of Finance), at least
initially, appeared supportive but not overly forcing.
What occurred with respect to accruals accounting for
central government in the RoI can be contrasted with what
happened in the UK. RAB was ‘driven’ into the UK, a process
possibly redolent of coercive isomorphism (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977). Senior political figures had championed a
wide range of NPM reforms, providing a rationale for these
in terms that the public sector needed to be more performance
focused and managers needed to be provided with
better information to make decisions. RAB fitted into this
scheme and was similarly supported. It was only in 1994
that it was proposed to adopt accruals accounting in central
government in the UK; similar to when it was being
mooted in the RoI. But what happened thereafter was very
different. In the UK the initial announcement was quickly
followed by a Green (discussion) Paper in 1994 and a UK
Treasury White (policy) Paper in 1995 which contained the
broad strategy for managing the transition and presented
a timetable for ‘live’ management accounting and financial
reporting systems by 2003/2004.
A main difference between the UK and RoI is that of
political and ideological drive, something suggested by
Hofstede (2001) and Pina et al. (2009). Since the 1970s
NPM was regarded by all major UK parties as received
political wisdom, being viewed as what was required to
be a modern, effective public administration. In contrast,
the RoI, possibly because of amore consensual, collectivist
culture than the UK in terms of both politics and social
issues, did not experience such a shift in public policy. A
lack of strong political ideology in the RoI, coupled with
an electoral system that often resulted in coalition governments
(rather than a majoritarian government as was
generally the situation in the UK) reinforced amore reflective,
gradualist approach. In such an environment radical
and speedy shifts in public policy are unlikely; and the
opportunity to block change from within, or from below, is
increased. Certainly the RoI interviews demonstrated that
there was an apprehens
กระดาษนี้ติดตามความคืบหน้าของบัญชีในการรับรู้รัฐบาลกลางในสหราชอาณาจักรและ RoI จากช่วงปี 1990ในขณะที่ดูเหมือนว่า ค่าเดินทางการบัญชีที่สำคัญเปลี่ยนยฒ ผลที่เกิดขึ้นจริงของการกระบวนการไม่แตกต่างกันมากในประเทศที่สอง สหราชอาณาจักรหลักการรับรู้บัญชีที่ฝังตัวในการบริหารจัดการบัญชี และการเงินระบบ รายงานในขณะที่RoI เปลี่ยนแปลงค่อนข้างเล็ก และลึกซึ้งระบบที่ใช้เงินสดที่เก็บรักษาไว้ให้การเชื่อมโยงระหว่างการรับรู้บัญชีและ NPMลูกทีมที่แตกต่างกันของการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางบัญชีได้ทีไม่ไม่คาดคิด ฮูด (1995) ระบุสหราชอาณาจักรเป็นมีความเข้มสูงเบิ้ลแท็ป ตรงข้ามกับร้อยเป็นความเข้มปานกลางเบิ้ลแท็ป แนวคิด NPM และผลการเปลี่ยนแปลง ในทั้งสองประเทศจัดเหล่านี้การจัดประเภท สัมภาษณ์ Fromthe โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งจากผู้ดำเนินการ ในการร้อย จากงานวิจัยก่อนหน้านี้ (Mellettet al. 2007), UK วิธีการเกี่ยวกับการรับรู้บัญชีมีเซ็กส์ เป็นอุดมการณ์ค่อนข้าง หรือบางทีนา ๆ ที่จะได้รับตำแหน่งขึ้นอยู่ไม่เพียงพอตรวจสอบสถาน โดยคมชัด RoI ปรากฏเพิ่มเติมในทางปฏิบัติโดยความคิดหรือวิธีประเมินคำผลปฏิบัติการ observable คู่นี้วัฒนธรรม consensual ขึ้นการอภิปรายกัน ในการสภาพแวดล้อมที่กังวลได้เกิดขึ้นปรากฏช้าลง หรือ dissipated แม้ ความกระตือรือร้นในthe RoI. In particular, a realisation of the difficulty of sustainingthe change to accruals accounting on cost-benefitgrounds is clear from the UK interviews in this study (andalso in earlier Connolly and Hyndman, 2006, research).Such information obviously filtered to those consideringchange in the RoI (as was highlighted in the RoI interviews)and this seemed to influence opinion.Perhaps a surprising feature of this research is that theRoI ostensibly appeared to commit itself to such a significantand radical accounting change in the early 1990s.An aspect of this appeared to be influenced by the ‘MScgroup’ of senior civil servants who visited New Zealandand Australia. These individuals seemed to be convincedby the potential benefits of accruals accounting (albeit thatnone of this group was from a professional accountancybackground) and they sought to become influencers forchange within the RoI. However, the ability of this smallgroup of bureaucrats to maintain momentum was limited,something anticipated from Carpenter and Feroz’s(2001) research, as the impact of such a significant transformationbecame more widely appreciated, and in themore bottom-up, consensual RoI culture, the opportunityto oppose or restrict change was given room to develop. Inaddition, political forces remained peripheral to the arguments,while the more administrative ‘centre’ (possiblybest represented by the Department of Finance), at leastinitially, appeared supportive but not overly forcing.What occurred with respect to accruals accounting forcentral government in the RoI can be contrasted with whathappened in the UK. RAB was ‘driven’ into the UK, a processpossibly redolent of coercive isomorphism (Meyer andRowan, 1977). Senior political figures had championed awide range of NPM reforms, providing a rationale for thesein terms that the public sector needed to be more performancefocused and managers needed to be provided withbetter information to make decisions. RAB fitted into thisscheme and was similarly supported. It was only in 1994that it was proposed to adopt accruals accounting in centralgovernment in the UK; similar to when it was beingmooted in the RoI. But what happened thereafter was verydifferent. In the UK the initial announcement was quicklyfollowed by a Green (discussion) Paper in 1994 and a UKTreasury White (policy) Paper in 1995 which contained thebroad strategy for managing the transition and presenteda timetable for ‘live’ management accounting and financialreporting systems by 2003/2004.A main difference between the UK and RoI is that ofpolitical and ideological drive, something suggested byHofstede (2001) and Pina et al. (2009). Since the 1970sNPM was regarded by all major UK parties as receivedpolitical wisdom, being viewed as what was required tobe a modern, effective public administration. In contrast,the RoI, possibly because of amore consensual, collectivistculture than the UK in terms of both politics and socialissues, did not experience such a shift in public policy. Alack of strong political ideology in the RoI, coupled withan electoral system that often resulted in coalition governments(rather than a majoritarian government as wasgenerally the situation in the UK) reinforced amore reflective,gradualist approach. In such an environment radicaland speedy shifts in public policy are unlikely; and theopportunity to block change from within, or from below, isincreased. Certainly the RoI interviews demonstrated thatthere was an apprehens
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