Meanwhile, some scholars have conducted research onland fiancé and urban development from the perspectives ofcentral-local state relationships and tax arrangements. For exam-ple, Tao et al. (2010) attribute the pro-growth incentives of localFiggovernments to the central-local fiscal arrangement and state-business relations. Meanwhile, local governments are keen ondeveloping their manufacturing industries even though they haveto lease land at a low price, and this is not done due to the lack ofrevenue motivation, but because of the constraints imposed by themobility of manufacturing assets. According to Ye and Wu (2014),from 1980 to 2010, the central government collected over 51% ofthe national fiscal revenue, but only covered 20% of the expendi-tures. In contrast, local governments were responsible for over 80%of the social expenditures, but received less than 50% of the revenue.As a consequence, local governments have had to seek extra bud-getary revenue from the central government and “land financing”has been found to be a very powerful tool.