Since the end of the Cold War, many countries have attempted to transition from authoritar- ian governments to democracies, with varied results and many false starts. Most often these attempts at transition are precipitated by social movements, mass protest, or instability, and not a planned move by the leadership. The political transition that began in Myanmar with the
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT
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elections of 2010 is a rather unusual example of a planned transition, as the leadership staged gradual steps toward democratization while retaining many of the authoritarian structures of the previous government during the transition. The new structures of governance now in place are still far from meeting the standards of genuine democracy. But the process has been relatively inclusive of the former regime’s opponents—both democracy advocates and ethnic minorities—thereby attracting great interest and support from the international community. This study analyzes the elements that brought Myanmar’s transition about and the issues that threaten to arrest and complicate it five years later, in the present. Myanmar endured more than five decades of military rule and domination since General Ne Win’s military coup of 1962. The 2010 vote was not the country’s first attempt to return to elected governance. In 1974, Ne Win introduced a socialist constitution and single-party parliament, albeit one dominated by the military. In 1990, the State Law and Order Restora- tion Council (SLORC) held multiparty elections but refused to seat the parliament when the democratic opposition won an overwhelming majority of seats. The 2010 effort was more far-reaching and carefully mapped than previous attempts: The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)1 had spent twenty years painstakingly drafting a new constitution to pave the way for multiparty elections that would guarantee continuing military control over the political process, which they christened “discipline flourishing democracy.” This 2008 constitution was clearly a model of electoral authoritarianism, common to many developing countries, where dictatorships of one kind or another seek to cloak themselves in an elected veneer. The outgoing military regime openly manipulated the elections of 2010 to produce the desired outcome: a quasi-elected government in which uniformed military were appointed to one-quarter of all parliamentary seats. All positions of authority were occupied by senior military leaders from the SPDC who had taken off their uniforms on the eve of the elec- tions and run for office. Observers both inside and outside the country thus expected the new government to be simply a rehash of the SPDC in civilian clothing, with the uniformed military embedded in the center, holding veto power over all crucial decisions and poised to reinstate martial law at will—all according to the new constitution. There was surprise and disbelief, therefore, when the new president immediately announced his intention to undertake sweeping political and economic reforms of a dimen- sion unimaginable for more than fifty years. Why, after laying such meticulous plans for a long, controlled transition, did the new ex-military leadership decide to undertake such far-reaching change so quickly? The answer lies in two fundamental factors. First, the provisions in the 2008 constitu- tion guaranteeing military control over essential parts of the political process gave military leaders the confidence to open the economy and expand the political space. Although the constitution promised broad freedoms and opportunities for participation in the political process for opposition and ethnic minority parties, it also left the old security structures and repressive regulations in place. Thus, leaders believed they could maintain internal secu- rity and stability as they gradually released constraints on the civilian population. Perhaps most important may have been the confidence it instilled in the senior general, who retired from office once the new leadership was in place. The second factor was the particular array of personalities who landed in key positions in the new government and their apparent determination to signal a distinct break with the past. Seasoned observers believe that the key to their behavior was Senior General Than Shwe’s deci- sion to step back from power and allow those he had put at the head of the new government to proceed as they felt best.2 After testing the waters by articulating increasingly sweeping reforms, initiating contacts with former enemies of the state in the democratic opposition— especially National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whom the SPDC had
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About the inStitute The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in conflict zones around the globe.
boARd of diRectoRS Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Wash- ington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Wash- ington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC
MeMbers ex OfficiO John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
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continually demonized—and the armed ethnic minority opposition, they saw that their moves did not elicit a negative reaction from the former senior general. This was the signal leaders needed to move ahead with a more dramatic reform program, particularly macroeconomic restructuring to produce the economic development that had eluded previous military govern- ments. The leadership recognized that this would require ending the country’s self-imposed isolation and opening Myanmar to the world. They also recognized that a degree of political liberalization was needed, both to invigorate the civilian population at home and to respond to the demands of Western governments. Myanmar’s leaders seem to have calculated these plans within the five-year time frame of the new government’s first term—the only period of time they could be certain of controlling. This may have been what lent a sense of urgency to the early reforms. This report describes the two parallel factors in Myanmar’s transition to explore whether its elements might be instructive for formulating orderly transition elsewhere. Although Myanmar’s transition still has many major challenges to overcome and is by no means assured, the political and economic liberalization achieved during its first three years has opened unexpected new possibilities—for better or for worse—for the country’s future. Given the many chaotic attempts to replace authoritarian governments that we are witness- ing today, it is possible that Myanmar’s experience may hold some valuable lessons.