Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to shed some light on the state of research of the Nanjing Incident today. In conclusion, I would like to make a number of points about researching Nanjing.
First, to put it mildly, Nanjing is a controversial topic. Although our understanding of the events of Nanjing do not even begin to approach our understanding of the holocaust, it is certainly possible to demonise anyone who budges from the orthodox position as being a denier on par with a David Irving. The problem is that the orthodox position is completely different in China and Japan, and within Japan itself there are three distinct orthodoxies. Although there is real debate in Japan, no one there now accepts the figure of 300,000 victims as plausible, while in China the figure is set in concrete (in both senses of the word) at the entrance of the Memorial for the Compatriot [Chinese] Victims of the Japanese Massacre in Nanjing. Unless the debate is to continue to run on parallel lines, never to come together to produce a deeper, more complete and transnational understanding of this historical event, this is not a situation to be welcomed. How to overcome it, on the other hand, poses a dilemma. As long as much of the debate is dominated by ideologues, the sensible option for historians may well be to keep their heads low and research other topics. That, however, cannot be a desirable outcome. Historians surely have an obligation to combat the trend to use Nanjing as a weapon in contemporary ideological and international contests.
Secondly, too many Japanese researchers in particular are either completely ignorant of, or do not care about, the fact that Nanjing for better or for worse has become a central plank in the construction of the modern self-identity of the Chinese. To discuss Nanjing is to threaten this self-identity. Once aware of this fact, all who participate in the debate need to show some sensitivity to it. I am not arguing that the Chinese orthodoxy needs to be accepted without question because the feelings of so many will be hurt if it is questioned. Indeed, I strongly believe that human beings have to come to terms with the "real" past and accept it, and that it is more dangerous (at least in the long term) to found national identity on a lie than to discover the truth and live with it. However, some effort does need to be made (on both extremes of the debate) to avoid the use of inflammatory language, and to show a much greater awareness of and sensitivity to the moral implications of historical inquiry.
Thirdly, as historians, it is our obligation to examine calmly the primary materials and reconstruct the history of Nanjing on the basis of what those materials say. Some clearly want to absolve the Japanese of all blame, while others want to depict the Japanese as a uniquely brutal and ruthless race. Neither position should form the starting point of any discussion of the events in Nanjing - although, of course, either might be the conclusion of any such examination. The publication of as many primary materials as possible is clearly a basic condition for this approach, so we need to encourage the discovery and publication of as much as possible.
Finally, a dialogue between historians working on the Nanjing Incident needs to be promoted. Again, I have great hopes for the forum provided by the English language, where researchers from both Japan and China can debate with researchers from third-party countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia. The problem with the Chinese and Japanese language discourses is that they are both so insular and the political environments are so charged. It is in the market of ideas and through constant debate (and perhaps the mediation provided by "neutral", third-party historians), that the truth will be approached.