The hierarchy also embodies some of the values of mathematicians. Namely, the more formal, abstract and impersonal that the mathematical knowledge is, the more highly it is valued. The more heuristic, concrete and personal mathematical knowledge is, the less it is prized. Restive (1985) argues that the development of abstract mathematics follows from the economic and social separation of the ‘hand’ and ‘brain’. For abstract mathematics is far removed from practical concerns. Since the ‘brain’ is associated with wealth and power in society, this division may be said to lead to the above values.
The values described above lead to the identification of mathematics with its formal representation (on the syntactical level). This is an identification which is made both by mathematicians, and philosophers of mathematics (at least those endorsing the absolutist philosophies). The valuing of abstraction in mathematics may also partly explain why mathematics is objectified. For the values emphasize the pure forms and rules of mathematics, facilitating their objectification and reification, as Davis (1974) suggests. This valuation allows the objectified concepts and rules of mathematics to be depersonalized and reformulated with little concerns of ownership, unlike literary creations. Such changes are subject to strict and general mathematical rules and values, which are a part of the mathematical culture. This has the result of offsetting some of the effects of sectional interests exercised by those with power in the community of mathematicians. However, this in no way threatens the status of the most powerful mathematicians. For the objective rules of acceptable knowledge serve to legitimate the position of the elite in the mathematical community.
Restive (1988) distinguishes between ‘technical’ and ‘social’ talk of mathematics, as we saw, and argues that unless the latter is included, mathematics as a social construction cannot be understood. Technical talk is identified here with the first and second levels (the level of syntax and semantics), and social talk is identified with the third level (that of pragmatics and professional concerns).
Denied access to this last level, no sociology of mathematics is possible, including a social constructionist sociology of mathematics. However social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics does not need access to this level, although it requires the existence of the social and language, in general. An innovation of social constructivism is the acceptance of the second level (semantics) as central to the philosophy of mathematics, following Lakatos. For traditional philosophies of mathematics focus on the first level alone.
Sociologically the three levels may be regarded as distinct but inter-related discursive practices, after Foucault. For each has its own symbol systems, knowledge base social context and associated power relationships, although they may be hidden. For example, at the level of syntax, there are rigorous rules concerning acceptable forms, which are strictly maintained by the mathematics establishment (although they change over time). This can be seen as the exercise of power by a social group. In contrast, the absolutist mathematician’s view is that nothing but logical reasoning and rational decision-making is relevant to this level. Thus a full sociological understanding of mathematics requires an understanding of these discursive practices, as well as their complex inter-relationships. Making these three levels explicit, as above, is a first step towards this understanding.
D. sociological parallels of social constructivism
The above suggests that social constructivism may offer 2 potentially fruitful parallel sociological account of mathematics. Such a parallel, highly compatible with social constructivism is already partly developed by Restive (1984,1985,1988) and others. Although sociological parallels do not add weight to social constructivism in purely philosophical terms, they offer the prospect of an interdisciplinary social constructivist theory. Offering a broader account of mathematics than a philosophy alone. Mathematics is a single phenomenon, and a single account applicable to each of the perspectives of philosophy, history, sociology and psychology is desirable, since it reflects the unity of mathematics. If successful, such an account would have the characteristics of unity, simplicity and generality, which are good grounds for theory choice.