Discussion and Concluding Remarks This article introduces a typology of cooperative models based on the concept of ownership rights. In this typology, the traditional cooperative structure and the investor-orientedfirm (IOF) are seen as polar forms of organization. Addition-ally, based on multiple examples drawn from case study evidence, the typology identifiesfive nontraditional cooperative models. These models are considered departures from the traditional cooperative structure because they relax some or, in the limit, all restrictions on traditional cooperative ownership rights. Why are agricultural cooperatives pursuing these new organizational mod-els? Investment constraints arise in agricultural cooperatives as a result of free rider, horizon, and portfolio problems, which in turn emerge because own-ership rights are restricted to members, are nontransferable, redeemable, and have benefit distribution proportional to usage rather than member investment (Vitaliano). As a result, cooperative members lack necessary incentives to in-vest in traditional cooperatives because their investment is illiquid and does not receive adequate returns. Risk-bearing costs are simply too high. We ar-gue that by relaxing some of these restrictions on ownership rights, nontra-ditional cooperatives may provide incentives for member and nonmember in-vestment in organization-specific assets, thereby ameliorating perceivedfinan-cial constraints. However, only systematic empirical evidence on the causes and
Understanding New Cooperative Models 359 consequences of cooperative restructurings may provide a test for this capital constraint hypothesis. Our analysis of new cooperative models suggests that in general, the solution of perceivedfinancial constraints in cooperatives entails some degree of organiza-tional redesign rather than the extreme solution of conversion or demutualization. That is, ownership rights related to residual return and control rights of agents tied contractually to thefirm are redefined and reassigned. For example, the co-operative may choose to relax the restriction that ownership rights be restricted to member-patrons or introduce transferable equity shares to build a permanent equity capital structure. However, when restrictions on traditional cooperative ownership rights are attenuated, new organization costs may surface as agency, collective decision making, and influence costs. In other words, cooperative lead-ers should be aware of the trade-offs involved in organizational redesign. The rapid and fundamental structural changes occurring in the global food system—commonly referred to as agricultural industrialization—exposes agri-cultural cooperatives to heightened domestic and international competition from other business forms. These changes also suggest that it is important to consider whether the organizational structures that have evolved in the past are likely to remain appropriate for the future. The success of agricultural cooperatives in re-sponding to the challenges brought about by agricultural industrialization will likely depend on both competitive strategy and organizational structure. Yet, it is important for cooperative leaders contemplating organizational change to bear in mind that “the decision of which organizational form to choose depends on the fundamental orientation of the producer-owners” (Royer, p. 96). It is crucial, therefore, that adequate communication exists between cooperative leaders and members. This article is intended to contribute to this dialogue in order to fa-cilitate a better-informed strategic decision-making process between cooperative managers, directors, and members in choosing among alternative cooperative ownership structures.
บทสนทนาและสรุปข้อสังเกตนี้แนะนำการจำแนกรูปแบบสหกรณ์ตามแนวคิดของความเป็นเจ้าของสิทธิ ในการจำแนกนี้ โครงสร้างสหกรณ์แบบดั้งเดิมและการลงทุน-orientedfirm (IOF) จะเห็นเป็นรูปแบบเชิงขั้วขององค์กร เพิ่มพันธมิตร ขึ้นอยู่กับหลายอย่างออกจากหลักฐานกรณีศึกษา จำแนก identifiesfive nontraditional สหกรณ์รูปแบบ โมเดลเหล่านี้ถือว่าออกจากโครงสร้างสหกรณ์แบบดั้งเดิมเนื่องจากพวกเขาผ่อนคลายบาง หรือ จำกัด ข้อจำกัดทั้งหมดสิทธิเป็นเจ้าของสหกรณ์แบบดั้งเดิม ทำไมมีสหกรณ์การเกษตรใฝ่หาเหล่านี้ใหม่องค์กร mod-แล้ง ข้อจำกัดการลงทุนที่เกิดขึ้นในสหกรณ์การเกษตรจากไรเดอร์ฟรี ขอบฟ้า และผลงาน ปัญหา ซึ่งจะเกิดเนื่องจาก ership เป็นเจ้าของสิทธิ์จำกัดสมาชิก nontransferable เต็มจำน และมีประโยชน์แจกแจงสัดส่วนการลงทุนการใช้งานมากกว่าที่เป็นสมาชิก (Vitaliano) ดังนั้น สมาชิกสหกรณ์ขาดแรงจูงใจความจำเป็นในเสื้อในแบบสหกรณ์เนื่องจากการลงทุนเป็น illiquid และได้รับผลตอบแทนที่เพียงพอ มีต้นทุนที่แบกความเสี่ยงสูงเกินไป เราว่า ด้วยการพักผ่อนของข้อจำกัดเหล่านี้เป็นเจ้าของสิทธิ nontra ditional สหกรณ์อาจมีแรงจูงใจสำหรับสมาชิกและ nonmember gue ar ใน vestment ในองค์กรเฉพาะสินทรัพย์ ameliorating จำกัด perceivedfinan ซึ่งกันและกันจึง อย่างไรก็ตาม เท่านั้นระบบประจักษ์หลักฐานสาเหตุ และUnderstanding New Cooperative Models 359 consequences of cooperative restructurings may provide a test for this capital constraint hypothesis. Our analysis of new cooperative models suggests that in general, the solution of perceivedfinancial constraints in cooperatives entails some degree of organiza-tional redesign rather than the extreme solution of conversion or demutualization. That is, ownership rights related to residual return and control rights of agents tied contractually to thefirm are redefined and reassigned. For example, the co-operative may choose to relax the restriction that ownership rights be restricted to member-patrons or introduce transferable equity shares to build a permanent equity capital structure. However, when restrictions on traditional cooperative ownership rights are attenuated, new organization costs may surface as agency, collective decision making, and influence costs. In other words, cooperative lead-ers should be aware of the trade-offs involved in organizational redesign. The rapid and fundamental structural changes occurring in the global food system—commonly referred to as agricultural industrialization—exposes agri-cultural cooperatives to heightened domestic and international competition from other business forms. These changes also suggest that it is important to consider whether the organizational structures that have evolved in the past are likely to remain appropriate for the future. The success of agricultural cooperatives in re-sponding to the challenges brought about by agricultural industrialization will likely depend on both competitive strategy and organizational structure. Yet, it is important for cooperative leaders contemplating organizational change to bear in mind that “the decision of which organizational form to choose depends on the fundamental orientation of the producer-owners” (Royer, p. 96). It is crucial, therefore, that adequate communication exists between cooperative leaders and members. This article is intended to contribute to this dialogue in order to fa-cilitate a better-informed strategic decision-making process between cooperative managers, directors, and members in choosing among alternative cooperative ownership structures.
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