Material Loss Review of Western Corporate Federal Credit Union
OIG-10-19
7
borrowing to obtain liquidity, and the values of the securities had experienced little or no
loss.15
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Findings Regarding Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) 16
Beginning in 2007, delinquency and foreclosure rates for sub-prime mortgage loans in
the United States dramatically increased, creating turmoil in the markets for RMBS
backed by such loans. The rating agencies‘ performance in rating these structured
finance products raised questions about the accuracy of their credit ratings generally, as
well as the integrity of the ratings process as a whole. In August 2007, the SEC initiated
examinations of three credit rating agencies (NRSROs) -- Fitch Ratings, Ltd. (―Fitch‖),
Moody‘s Investor Services, Inc. (―Moody‘s‖), and Standard & Poor‘s Ratings Services
(―S&P‖) -- to review their role in the turmoil in the sub-prime mortgage-related securities
markets.
The SEC‘s examination review generally covered a period starting from January 2004
through July 2008 when the report was issued. We identified the following three key
findings from the SEC report that highlighted flaws in the RMBS ratings process:
There was no requirement that a rating agency verify the information contained in
RMBS loan portfolios presented to it for rating. Additionally, rating agencies were
not required to insist that issuers perform due diligence, and they were not
required to obtain reports concerning the level of due diligence performed by
issuers. Each rating agency publicly disclosed that it did not engage in any due
diligence or otherwise seek to verify the accuracy or quality of the loan data
underlying the RMBS pools they rated during the review period. Each rating
agency‘s ―Code of Conduct‖ clearly stated that it was under no obligation to
perform, and did not perform, due diligence. Each agency also noted that the
assignment of a rating is not a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness, or
timeliness of the information relied on in connection with the rating. The rating
agencies each relied on the information provided to them by the sponsor of the
RMBS. They did not verify the integrity and accuracy of such information as, in
their view, due diligence duties belonged to the other parties in the process.
They also did not seek representations from sponsors that due diligence was
performed.
Each of the NRSROs examined used the ―issuer pays‖ model, in which the
arranger or other entity that issues the security is also seeking the rating, and
pays the rating agency for the rating. The conflict of interest inherent in this
model is that rating agencies have an interest in generating business from the
firms that seek the rating, which could conflict with providing ratings of integrity.
Material Loss Review of Western Corporate Federal Credit UnionOIG-10-197borrowing to obtain liquidity, and the values of the securities had experienced little or noloss.15Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Findings Regarding NationallyRecognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) 16Beginning in 2007, delinquency and foreclosure rates for sub-prime mortgage loans inthe United States dramatically increased, creating turmoil in the markets for RMBSbacked by such loans. The rating agencies‘ performance in rating these structuredfinance products raised questions about the accuracy of their credit ratings generally, aswell as the integrity of the ratings process as a whole. In August 2007, the SEC initiatedexaminations of three credit rating agencies (NRSROs) -- Fitch Ratings, Ltd. (―Fitch‖),Moody‘s Investor Services, Inc. (―Moody‘s‖), and Standard & Poor‘s Ratings Services(―S&P‖) -- to review their role in the turmoil in the sub-prime mortgage-related securitiesmarkets.The SEC‘s examination review generally covered a period starting from January 2004through July 2008 when the report was issued. We identified the following three keyfindings from the SEC report that highlighted flaws in the RMBS ratings process: There was no requirement that a rating agency verify the information contained inRMBS loan portfolios presented to it for rating. Additionally, rating agencies werenot required to insist that issuers perform due diligence, and they were notrequired to obtain reports concerning the level of due diligence performed byissuers. Each rating agency publicly disclosed that it did not engage in any duediligence or otherwise seek to verify the accuracy or quality of the loan dataunderlying the RMBS pools they rated during the review period. Each ratingagency‘s ―Code of Conduct‖ clearly stated that it was under no obligation toperform, and did not perform, due diligence. Each agency also noted that theassignment of a rating is not a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness, ortimeliness of the information relied on in connection with the rating. The ratingagencies each relied on the information provided to them by the sponsor of theRMBS. They did not verify the integrity and accuracy of such information as, intheir view, due diligence duties belonged to the other parties in the process.They also did not seek representations from sponsors that due diligence wasperformed. Each of the NRSROs examined used the ―issuer pays‖ model, in which thearranger or other entity that issues the security is also seeking the rating, andpays the rating agency for the rating. The conflict of interest inherent in thismodel is that rating agencies have an interest in generating business from thefirms that seek the rating, which could conflict with providing ratings of integrity.
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