The success of the cooperative multidivisional structure is significantly affected by how well divisions process information. However , because cooperation among divisions implies a loss of managerial autonomy , division managers may not readily commit themselves to the type of integrative information processing activities that this structure demands. Moreover , coordination among divisions sometimes results in an unequal flow of positive outcomes to divisional managers , In other words , when managerial rewards are based at least in part on the performance of individual divisions , the manager of the division that is able t benefit the most by the sharing of corporate competencies might be viewed as receiving relative gains at others ' expense. Strategic controls are important in these instances , as divisional mangers performance can be evaluated at least partly on the basis of how well they have facilitated interdivisional cooperative efforts. In addition , using reward systems that emphasize overall company performance , besides outcomes achieved by individual division , helps overcome problems associated with the cooperative from. Still , the costs of coordination and inertia in organizations limit the amount of related diversification attempted (i.e., they constrain the economies of scope that can be created).