Conclusion and Discussion
As independent agencies are insulated from politics and the electoral
process, scholars have emphasized the importance of the inclusion of
accountability arrangements in the design of these organizations. However,
the degree to which such arrangements are, in practice, incorporated into
the statutes of the organizations varies considerably. This study has
addressed the question why some independent agencies are subject to more
provisions for accountability than others. From previous research, we know
about the impact of such factors as the need for credible commitments,
policy complexity, and government capacity. A factor which has not yet
been included in studies on the institutional design of agencies is political
salience. Although previous studies have pointed at the importance of
political salience for such outcomes as voting behavior, political choices of
government and parliament, and de facto control over bureaucracies and independent agencies, we do not know much about its effect on the institutional
design of organizations. This study therefore examines the impact
of political salience on statutory provisions for political accountability,
controlling for other determinants of delegation to independent agencies.
To do so, original data have been used on the accountability provisions in
the statutes of 103 Dutch independent agencies.
The results of the analysis show that political salience is an important
determinant of the degree of formal political accountability. Salience affects
accountability in two ways. First of all, independent agencies which operate in
more salient issue areas are also subject to more extensive accountability
arrangements. This is, to begin with, relevant from a theoretical point of view.
Previous research has shown that political salience has an impact on the de facto
control which politicians choose to exercise over the activities of agencies. This
study demonstrates that salience also affects the institutional design of independent
agencies. Hence we know now that independent agencies which deal
with salient policy issues are not only subject to more political steering and
influencing, but they are also made subject to more statutory provisions for
accountability. Looking at the implications for democratic governance, the
findings are both reassuring and disturbing. On the one hand, the findings are
encouraging as they indicate that politicians arewilling to invest more time and
resources in keeping an eye on activities which they themselves, and the people
they represent, care about. On the other hand, the analysis points out that
there is a category of independent agencies which are, in every respect, under
the radar. Not only do they operate in policy areas which do not attract a lot of
attention, but they are also largely exempted from accountability requirements.
This leaves these organizations with a lot of opportunities to shirk, and to
misuse or abuse their political power, and it leaves us with the question how
eventual misconduct by the organizations can be prevented and detected. This
is an implication we should be concerned about.
Political salience affects accountability in still another way. Independent
agencies whose statutes are written in a period in which accountability itself
is a salient issue are also subject to higher degrees of accountability.
Accountability has become a key issue on the Dutch political agenda, and
this is reflected in the degree of political accountability incorporated into
the design of independent agencies. It should be noted that the generalization
of this finding to other political contexts is less straightforward than
it is for the finding on issue salience. Whilst there is no reason to expect that
issue salience is not important for the institutional design of agencies in
other countries, the significance of the issue of accountability, and the
change in significance of the issue, may vary across countries. The importance
of the salience of the issue of accountability for the institutional design of
agencies can be expected to vary accordingly. We may hypothesize that
degrees of formal political accountability are lower in countries in which accountability is less of a salient issue, and we may expect to find less of an effect of salience of accountability in countries in which no significant change in the perception of accountability has taken place. Future research could examine whether empirical evidence supports these hypotheses.
Conclusion and Discussion
As independent agencies are insulated from politics and the electoral
process, scholars have emphasized the importance of the inclusion of
accountability arrangements in the design of these organizations. However,
the degree to which such arrangements are, in practice, incorporated into
the statutes of the organizations varies considerably. This study has
addressed the question why some independent agencies are subject to more
provisions for accountability than others. From previous research, we know
about the impact of such factors as the need for credible commitments,
policy complexity, and government capacity. A factor which has not yet
been included in studies on the institutional design of agencies is political
salience. Although previous studies have pointed at the importance of
political salience for such outcomes as voting behavior, political choices of
government and parliament, and de facto control over bureaucracies and independent agencies, we do not know much about its effect on the institutional
design of organizations. This study therefore examines the impact
of political salience on statutory provisions for political accountability,
controlling for other determinants of delegation to independent agencies.
To do so, original data have been used on the accountability provisions in
the statutes of 103 Dutch independent agencies.
The results of the analysis show that political salience is an important
determinant of the degree of formal political accountability. Salience affects
accountability in two ways. First of all, independent agencies which operate in
more salient issue areas are also subject to more extensive accountability
arrangements. This is, to begin with, relevant from a theoretical point of view.
Previous research has shown that political salience has an impact on the de facto
control which politicians choose to exercise over the activities of agencies. This
study demonstrates that salience also affects the institutional design of independent
agencies. Hence we know now that independent agencies which deal
with salient policy issues are not only subject to more political steering and
influencing, but they are also made subject to more statutory provisions for
accountability. Looking at the implications for democratic governance, the
findings are both reassuring and disturbing. On the one hand, the findings are
encouraging as they indicate that politicians arewilling to invest more time and
resources in keeping an eye on activities which they themselves, and the people
they represent, care about. On the other hand, the analysis points out that
there is a category of independent agencies which are, in every respect, under
the radar. Not only do they operate in policy areas which do not attract a lot of
attention, but they are also largely exempted from accountability requirements.
This leaves these organizations with a lot of opportunities to shirk, and to
misuse or abuse their political power, and it leaves us with the question how
eventual misconduct by the organizations can be prevented and detected. This
is an implication we should be concerned about.
Political salience affects accountability in still another way. Independent
agencies whose statutes are written in a period in which accountability itself
is a salient issue are also subject to higher degrees of accountability.
Accountability has become a key issue on the Dutch political agenda, and
this is reflected in the degree of political accountability incorporated into
the design of independent agencies. It should be noted that the generalization
of this finding to other political contexts is less straightforward than
it is for the finding on issue salience. Whilst there is no reason to expect that
issue salience is not important for the institutional design of agencies in
other countries, the significance of the issue of accountability, and the
change in significance of the issue, may vary across countries. The importance
of the salience of the issue of accountability for the institutional design of
agencies can be expected to vary accordingly. We may hypothesize that
degrees of formal political accountability are lower in countries in which accountability is less of a salient issue, and we may expect to find less of an effect of salience of accountability in countries in which no significant change in the perception of accountability has taken place. Future research could examine whether empirical evidence supports these hypotheses.
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