Our study contributes to prior literature in twoways. First, we provide evidence on the
potential impact of certain Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999) recommendations concerning
audit committee composition. Second, because under current regulations, all firms
listed on the three largest exchanges must have an audit committee, it is important to develop
more specific measures of audit committee effectiveness.1 By examining specific
audit committee characteristics, we provide more direct evidence on the association between
audit committee effectiveness, rather than audit committee presence, and the incidence
of financial misstatement.2
Our study utilizes a sample of 156 firms: 78 firms subject to SEC Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) matched with 78 non-sanctioned firms that are
similar in size, industry, national exchange and time period. Our results indicate that firms
with audit committees which meet minimum thresholds of both activity and independence
are less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC. We also document wide variation in our test
variable, with high proportions of sanctioned (62%) and control (33%) firms having audit
committees which do not meet relatively low thresholds of activity and independence. This
suggests that imposing a modest level of regulation can potentially help achieve the SEC’s
objectives with respect to financial misstatement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature
and develops the hypotheses, followed by a discussion of sample selection and research de-