4.6.7 Banks’ Behaviour and Misplaced Reliance of Sophisticated Mathematics and Statistics
There are many lessons to be learned from the financial crisis. There is a considerable body
of opinion that considers that poor risk management lay at the heart of the credit crisis. This
lack of awareness of risk exposure is reinforced by Sir John Gieve, who stated when Deputy
Governor of the Bank of England, that a weakness in the British banking system “was the
failure of the banks and many other investors to appreciate, price and manage risk”. The Bank
of England published its analysis of the vulnerabilities of the system in its Financial Stability
Reports of 2006 and 2007 (Gieve 2009). It delivered its findings to the CEOs of banks in both
London and New York. In particular, it described the banks’ exposure to global imbalances,
dependence on wholesale funding and the risk of structured credit markets seizing up in a
downturn. However, these executives paid scant regard to the reviews as they took comfort
from the sophistication of their risk management systems and hedging strategies and were
confident they could ride out the storm. The issue though, as Gieve explained in his speech,
was that the banks’ systems were preparing them for a shower, not a hurricane.
The predominant assumption of the banks was that the scale and complexity of the securitised
credit market had been matched by the evolution of statistically sophisticated and
effective techniques for measuring and managing the resulting risks. Central to many of the
techniques applied was the concept of value at risk (VaR), enabling mathematical inferences
about forward-looking risk (and future price movements) to be drawn from the observation of
past patterns of price movement. The financial crisis has revealed, however, severe problems
with these techniques. They suggest at the very least the need for significant changes in the
way that VaR-based methodologies have been applied; some, however, pose more fundamental
questions about our ability in principle to infer future risk from patterns observed in the past.
Four categories of problem have been distinguished in The Turner Review (FSA 2009a), and
are described in Chapter 25.
A primary message of the financial crisis was that the very complexity of the statistical
methods used to measure and manage risk made it increasingly difficult for an analyst to
convey the approach adopted and the content of the analysis, and for top management and
boards to assess and exercise judgement over the risks being taken. Statistical and mathematical
sophistication ended up not containing risk, but providing false assurance that the emerging
risks could be safely ignored.
4.6.7 Banks’ Behaviour and Misplaced Reliance of Sophisticated Mathematics and StatisticsThere are many lessons to be learned from the financial crisis. There is a considerable bodyof opinion that considers that poor risk management lay at the heart of the credit crisis. Thislack of awareness of risk exposure is reinforced by Sir John Gieve, who stated when DeputyGovernor of the Bank of England, that a weakness in the British banking system “was thefailure of the banks and many other investors to appreciate, price and manage risk”. The Bankof England published its analysis of the vulnerabilities of the system in its Financial StabilityReports of 2006 and 2007 (Gieve 2009). It delivered its findings to the CEOs of banks in bothLondon and New York. In particular, it described the banks’ exposure to global imbalances,dependence on wholesale funding and the risk of structured credit markets seizing up in adownturn. However, these executives paid scant regard to the reviews as they took comfortfrom the sophistication of their risk management systems and hedging strategies and wereconfident they could ride out the storm. The issue though, as Gieve explained in his speech,was that the banks’ systems were preparing them for a shower, not a hurricane.The predominant assumption of the banks was that the scale and complexity of the securitisedcredit market had been matched by the evolution of statistically sophisticated andeffective techniques for measuring and managing the resulting risks. Central to many of thetechniques applied was the concept of value at risk (VaR), enabling mathematical inferencesabout forward-looking risk (and future price movements) to be drawn from the observation ofpast patterns of price movement. The financial crisis has revealed, however, severe problemswith these techniques. They suggest at the very least the need for significant changes in theway that VaR-based methodologies have been applied; some, however, pose more fundamentalquestions about our ability in principle to infer future risk from patterns observed in the past.Four categories of problem have been distinguished in The Turner Review (FSA 2009a), andare described in Chapter 25.A primary message of the financial crisis was that the very complexity of the statisticalmethods used to measure and manage risk made it increasingly difficult for an analyst toconvey the approach adopted and the content of the analysis, and for top management andboards to assess and exercise judgement over the risks being taken. Statistical and mathematicalsophistication ended up not containing risk, but providing false assurance that the emergingrisks could be safely ignored.
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