Public choice or public choice theory refers to "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science".[1] Its content includes the study of political behavior.[2] In political science, it is the subset of positive political theory that studies self-interested agents (voters, politicians, bureaucrats) and their interactions, which can be represented in a number of ways, such as standard constrained utility maximization, game theory, or decision theory.[1] Public choice analysis has roots in positive analysis (“what is”) but is often used for normative purposes (“what ought to be”) in order to identify a problem or suggest improvements to constitutional rules (i.e., constitutional economics).[1][3]
Under the Journal of Economic Literature's classification code, public choice is a subarea of microeconomics, under JEL: D7: “Analysis of Collective Decision-Making” (specifically, JEL: D72: “Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior”).[4] Public choice theory is also closely related to social choice theory, a mathematical approach to aggregation of individual interests, welfares, or votes.[5] Much early work had aspects of both, and both use the tools of economics and game theory. Since voter behavior influences the behavior of public officials, public choice theory often uses results from social choice theory. General treatments of public choice may also be classified under public economics.