The European Union (EU) and the ASEAN are just a decade apart. However, EU has a far more sophisticated institutional structure and more democratic governance processes, making it worlds apart with ASEAN. This, even though both blocs engaged in reform measures almost around the same time. While ASEAN was working for its Charter, EU was pursuing the Treaty of Lisbon, which is also known as Reform Treaty. While ASEAN is stuck with consensus and non-interference as key principles, the EU has been quite vocal on the human rights situation in Central and Eastern European states. EU may also impose penalty and even expulsion to recalcitrant members. One of the results of the reform treaty was the qualified majority voting (QMV) where voting weights corresponds with the countries’ population. According to EU Ambassador to the Philippines Alistair MacDonald, the Reform Treaty further strengthened the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in decision-making; it created the post of president of the European Council; and it created the office of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. The treaty also retired the usage of the “European Community,” as EU takes on a legal personality Unlike ASEAN, the EU has structures such as the parliament, Supreme Court and court of appeals which “which ASEAN may or may not yet aspire.” The EU also has a civil society mechanism that is called right of citizen’s initiative. Civil society organizations (CSOs) may submit a proposal to the EU for as long as this is backed by one million signatures. It is generally believed that the developments at the EU triggered the formulation of ASEAN’s Charter. After all, both regional blocs were largely established for trade and security issues. One of the issues which tailed the pre and post ASEAN Charter process was the controversial EU-ASEAN free trade agreement, which basically intends to liberalize “substantially all goods and services,” including those which civil society bitterly fought at the World Trade Organization (WTO) such as government procurement, trade facilitation and competition policy. Although much of the EUASEAN FTA remains pending, one danger is that the EU might veer away from the regional track and instead further pursue bilateral with individual ASEAN members. The EU remains a major trading partner of ASEAN, bringing in more than 100 billion Euros. It also contributes 25 per cent of investments worth US$13 billion in ASEAN.
Such nature has nonetheless translated into breakthroughs towards stronger diplomatic ties. As Michael Vatikiotis puts it, “One can quibble about the effectiveness of ASEAN as a vehicle for concrete economic cooperation but it cannot be denied that by using diplomatic rather than military means, as well as a style of diplomacy based on indigenous rather than imported principles, ASEAN has succeeded in fostering a greater sense of regional unity and security.”2 One more recent example of such breakthrough happened in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis which devastated Burma. The junta earned condemnation when it refused to allow foreign aid, including those in ships which were just docked on ports and relief workers. However it relented to ASEAN which eventually formed an ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force that provided advice to the Tripartite Core Group (TCG). TCG consisted of ASEAN, Burma and United Nations. The Task Force and the TCG distributed much relief and conducted an assessment of the damages as well as cost of reconstruction and recovery. The assessment involved the World Bank and the ADB and a few CSOs. As UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes described, “Nargis showed us a new model of humanitarian partnership, adding the Special position and capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to those of the United Nations in working effectively with the government.”3 But because ASEAN is largely composed of countries with questionable human rights track record and repressive policies especially towards the civil society organizations and the media, it could hardly put its foot down on atrocious developments within the bloc such as Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor and the junta’s order for the continuing detention of Burmese leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The ASEAN initiative for the post Nargis relief and reconstruction was also viewed rather late, especially with the massive devastation the cyclone left.