equity prices. Journal of Finance 60, 2859–2894]. We create Gov-Score, a summary governance
measure based on 51 firm-specific provisions representing both internal and
external governance, and we show that a parsimonious index based on seven provisions
underlying Gov-Score fully drives the relation between Gov-Score and firm value. Our
results support the Bebchuk et al. (2005) findings that only a small subset of provisions
marketed by corporate governance data providers are related to firm valuation, and the
Cremers and Nair (2005) evidence that both internal and external governance are linked
to firm value. The 51 governance provisions we consider include five that are relevant to
accounting and public policy: stock option expensing, and four that are audit-related. We
find none of these five measures to be related to firm valuation. We document that only
one of the seven governance provisions important for firm valuation was mandated by
either the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 or the three major US stock exchanges. We provide
researchers with an alternative measure of governance to G-Index with three distinct
advantages: (1) broader in scope of governance, (2) covers more firms, and (3) more
dynamic, reflecting recent changes in the corporate governance environment.
equity prices. Journal of Finance 60, 2859–2894]. We create Gov-Score, a summary governance
measure based on 51 firm-specific provisions representing both internal and
external governance, and we show that a parsimonious index based on seven provisions
underlying Gov-Score fully drives the relation between Gov-Score and firm value. Our
results support the Bebchuk et al. (2005) findings that only a small subset of provisions
marketed by corporate governance data providers are related to firm valuation, and the
Cremers and Nair (2005) evidence that both internal and external governance are linked
to firm value. The 51 governance provisions we consider include five that are relevant to
accounting and public policy: stock option expensing, and four that are audit-related. We
find none of these five measures to be related to firm valuation. We document that only
one of the seven governance provisions important for firm valuation was mandated by
either the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 or the three major US stock exchanges. We provide
researchers with an alternative measure of governance to G-Index with three distinct
advantages: (1) broader in scope of governance, (2) covers more firms, and (3) more
dynamic, reflecting recent changes in the corporate governance environment.
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