W Multi-donor trust funds result from pool funding of various
donors to promote long-term and coordinated development
programming. They are less effective in disbursing funds
in the short-term, but can support long-term development
planning, funding, and statebuilding.
W Budget support has been found particularly effective in early
stages of state formation (East Timor, Afghanistan) and in
post-conflict countries with new political leadership
(Rwanda, Sierra Leone). Budget support and debt relief
free-up a portion of the state budget for discretionary public
spending, improve government ownership of development
planning and disbursement, and can help build institutional
capacity if combined with technical assistance.
W Technical cooperation involves investments in training,
advice, and research. It is crucial in war-to-peace transitions
to reduce asymmetries in education and skills between
the negotiating parties. Training and information creation
build joint knowledge platforms and reduce the gaps in
negotiation or analytical skill-sets.
W Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) are multi-stakeholder
initiatives that conceptualise, negotiate, and finance a shared
strategy for recovery and development in fragile and conflict
contexts. They are intended to become a foundation for
national development plans and resource mobilisation. If
PCNAs are conducted when a peace agreement is imminent,
they can draft joint futures in war-to-peace transitions.
Peace conditionality
W Peace conditionality is the use of development assistance
to persuade parties to stop fighting, implement peace
accords, and consolidate peace. Peace conditionality is
part of the larger phenomenon of aid conditionality that
illustrates development agencies’ concern for the way
their aid is spent.
W Peace conditionality has been found to work best if
• it nurtures a strong domestic constituency for peace;
• it is applied as part of a coherent and coordinated policy
that prioritizes peacemaking;
• it is perceived by local stakeholders to be even-handed;
and
• there is a high level of pre-existing development
assistance.
W Peace conditionality is ineffective in circumstances
in which
• other development agencies or donors are willing to
provide aid with no strings attached;
• aid is not coordinated;
• strong donor pressure creates a backlash from governments
or NSAGs against the international community; and
• other sources of financing provide higher inflows than
development assistance.
W Peace conditionality has been criticised to be incompatible
with local ownership of peace processes and policy
making.
QUESTIONS FOR THE MEDIATOR
Testing the attitude of development agencies
towards peacemaking
W What determines the mandate of particular development
agencies? Do they have statutory limitations of engagement
in conflict zones?
W What is the level of aid flows of the particular agency during
armed conflict? Who is the biggest aid provider? How long
have particular development agencies been present in the
country? How much aid investments have been lost due
to the conflict?
W Have development agencies and their staff been attacked
during the conflict? Do they want to engage in peace
process, or merely establish contact with the belligerents
to reduce attacks against their staff?
W Does a particular development agency plan a major postconflict
recovery operation after the signing of a peace
accord? Is it engaged in the planning or implementation
of PCNAs?
Mobilising development assistance for peacemaking
W Do aid agencies adopt a conflict-sensitive development
policy? How unified is the development community in
this approach?
W What are the aid instruments used in the delivery of aid?
Do aid agencies maximize the conflict resolution impact
of their programmes and projects?
W What expertise and contacts do aid agencies and individual aid
workers have that could potentially support a peace process?
W Is the conflict catalysed by structural inequalities and
social exclusion that can only be addressed through longterm
development interventions? Do the motivations of
one or various belligerents regarding these factors mirror
the aid agencies’ interests in poverty reduction?
W Does the belligerents’ future vision of the economy in
particular and society as a whole require the expertise of
the development agencies?
Testing the expected impact of development assistance
W Does the actual or promised development assistance
provide a credible alternative to the economic
opportunities of conflict? What are the alternative
economic opportunities that could potentially provide
higher rewards than development assistance?
W How sensitive are the parties towards incentives or threats
related to development assistance? How dependent are
they on aid flows? How credible are the incentives and
threats? How threat-resistant are the targeted parties?
W Is aid conditionality consistently applied by all donors
and to all parties? Is aid conditionality likely to provoke
a backlash from the government or NSAGs?