When analysts provide forecasts of both earnings and operating cash flow, they also
implicitly provide a forecast of total operating accruals. We posit that this increases the
transparency and the expected costs of accrual manipulations used to manage earnings.
As a consequence, we predict and find that accrual quality improves and firms’ propensity
to meet or beat earnings benchmarks declines following the provision of cash flow
forecasts. We also predict and find that firms turn to other benchmark-beating
mechanisms, such as real activities manipulation and earnings guidance in response
to the provision of cash flow forecasts
6. Conclusion and directions for future research
When analysts forecast both operating cash flow and earnings, they also implicitly provide a forecast of operating accruals.
Thus, cash flow forecasts enable investors and regulators to decompose an earnings surprise into the portion attributable to
cash flow and the portion attributable to accruals. We posit that cash flow forecasts make accrual manipulations to manage
earnings more transparent, which increases the expected costs to firms and managers of engaging in opportunistic earnings
management through accrual manipulations. Accordingly, we predict that the provision of cash flow forecasts deters firms
from engaging in accrual manipulation to manage earnings. As a consequence, we predict that accrual quality will improve
and firms’ propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks will decline following the provision of cash flow forecasts.
Overall, the evidence broadly supports our predictions. Using inter-temporal change analysis, we find that accrual quality
improves, and the probability of meeting earnings targets declines, after analysts begin issuing cash flow forecasts. Tests
using a propensity-score matched control sample do not reveal similarly significant changes in accrual quality or benchmark
beating. Additional analyses reveal that firms for which cash flow forecasts are provided turn to other benchmark-beating
mechanisms, such as real activities management and earnings guidance, following the provision of cash flow forecasts. Our
findings are of potential interest to investors and regulators because we identify a relatively low cost, market-driven
mechanism that helps curb firms’ attempts to manipulate accruals to meet analysts’ earnings estimates.
Our conclusions are subject to standard caveats regarding endogeneity. While our propensity-score matching procedure
and difference-in-differences design help mitigate such concerns, there is still a possibility that our findings are driven by
some omitted variable(s). We believe, however, that this possibility is remote given our findings that treatment firms seem to
trade off accrual management for real activities management and downward earnings guidance—actions that would be
expected if accrual manipulation is constrained (i.e., becomes more costly).